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SHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: THE 
EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS* 
Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko** 
ABSTRACT 
In Europe, important developments such as the entering into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon—which placed the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union at the very top of the hierarchy of norms—and the 
direct applicability by national courts of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in private law disputes have been highly influential 
for the rise in human rights reasoning by courts deciding intellectual 
property (IP) issues. The envisaged E.U. accession to the ECHR is likely to 
increase this process further. 
This article reflects on these developments by studying the role of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) in 
shaping European intellectual property standards. It presents an updated 
and modified version of the chapter entitled “Intellectual Property Before 
the European Court of Human Rights,” published by the authors in 2018, 
and provides the first comprehensive overview of ECtHR case law on IP 
from the court’s inception in January 1959 until today, March 2020. The 
article results from an analysis of more than ninety such cases, many of 
which have never been discussed before in the literature. Certain issues that 
are currently pending before the Strasbourg Court are also given exposure. 
The article spans subjects from the protection of the rights of IP 
holders under the property provision of the ECHR to the possibility of 
restricting such protection on the basis of the right to freedom of expression 
and information often invoked by the users of IP-protected content. It also 
analyzes the situations in which freedom of expression was invoked by the 
(actual or potential) IP holders themselves in order, for instance, to insure 
                                                           
* This article is an extended and updated version of an earlier work published by the authors 
that appeared as Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9 
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018). 
**Christophe Geiger is a Professor of Law and Director of the Research Department of the 
Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) at the University of Strasbourg 
(Strasbourg, France); Affiliated Senior Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation 
and Competition (Munich, Germany); and Spangenberg Fellow in Law & Technology at the 
Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the Arts at the Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law (Cleveland, US). Elena Izyumenko is a Researcher at the CEIPI at the 
University of Strasbourg (Strasbourg, France).  
1
Geiger and Izyumenko: Shaping Intellectual Property Rights Through Human Rights Adjudic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
528 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
that their trademark applications are registered. The potential of the right 
to privacy to serve both as a defense against certain IP enforcement 
measures—such as search orders—and as a basis for the protection of moral 
rights of creators is likewise discussed. The article further reviews the most 
prominent IP disputes which raised questions under the right to non-
discrimination and the right to a fair trial.  
This comprehensive overview of the case law of the ECtHR shows 
the emergence of a human rights framework for the intellectual property 
system in Europe, which—in combination with the increasing use of 
fundamental rights by national courts to solve private-party disputes—is 
gaining coherence and relevance in framing the conception and use of IP 
law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ECtHR is a supranational European tribunal setting the 
standards of human rights (HRs) protection in Europe. All states that are 
members to the Council of Europe1 are signatories of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)2 and, as a result, have to comply 
with the decisions of this court.3 In this sense, the ECtHR is comparable to 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on issues of federal law that apply to both 
the United States as a whole and to the fifty states individually. Unlike the 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, the ECtHR is a specialized human rights 
court, expressly concerned with Member States’ compliance with the rights 
set in the ECHR, rights such as freedom of expression, right to property, 
privacy, and fair trial. Human rights, as a branch of international law, are 
                                                           
1 The Council of Europe is an international organization of forty-seven members whose 
purpose is to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe. 
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. 
3 As of March 2020, Council of Europe counts forty-seven members. 
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much more influential in Europe than in the United States, which 
reluctantly accepts legal standards set outside of its own Congress or courts.4 
Nevertheless, in the United States, the rights analogous to those found in 
the ECHR are often granted through the U.S. Constitution. For instance, 
Article 10 of the ECHR, which deals with freedom of expression, is 
comparable with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, 
Article 6 of the ECHR, guaranteeing fair trials, is consistent with the Due 
Process Clauses found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.  
 Human (or constitutional) rights and intellectual property have 
been and continue to be thought of as independent areas of the law that 
hardly interoperate, despite much literature detailing their numerous 
interactions over the past couple of decades.5 More recently, however, 
discussions on the impact of intellectual property law on human and 
constitutional rights (and vice versa) have spilled over into academic 
textbooks and articles. Notably, both legislators and courts have started to 
pay attention to the many facets of the interplay between human rights and 
IP—a phenomenon that has sometimes been characterized as the 
“constitutionalization” of the IP legal system.6 
                                                           
4 The United States, for example, has never proceeded with ratification of the American 
Convention on Human Rights—an American analogue of the ECHR. Another principal 
instrument of the international human rights protection, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), albeit ratified by the United States in 1992, has faced so many 
reservations, understandings, and declarations that some have doubted its remaining ability 
to have any impact domestically. See, e.g., Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary: Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PAPERS PROJECT, https://www2.gwu.edu/
~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/cov-civilpol-rights.cfm [https://perma.cc/GD8T-8ZXH] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2020).  
5 See, e.g., LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011); Daniel J. Gervais, 
Human Rights and the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89 (Christophe Geiger ed., 
2015); Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and Fundamental Rights: Do They 
Interoperate?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BEYOND RIGHTS 197 (Niklas Bruun ed., 2005); 
Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 709 (2007); Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property 
Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger, 
“Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?]; Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the 
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property—An Update, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul Torremans ed., 4th ed. forthcoming 2020) 
[hereinafter Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual 
Property]; Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and 
Cooperating, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (Paul Torremans ed., 
2d ed. 2008). 
6 For further discussion, see Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra 
note 5; Mylly, supra note 5, at 103; Jens Schovsbo, Constitutional Foundations and 
4
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In the United States, the Supreme Court has rendered important 
decisions assessing compliance of the Copyright Term Extension Act and 
the subsequent Act restoring copyright protection to certain works that have 
already lapsed into the public domain under the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.7 Lately, certain trademark registration restrictions, 
contained in the Lanham Act, have even been found incompatible with the 
First Amendment.8 On a more fundamental level, the standards of 
intellectual property protection in the United States have frequently been 
assessed against the public interest goal set in the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, which 
famously states that “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries” should be 
conditioned on the “promot[ion] [of] the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”.9 
In the European Union, important developments, such as the 
entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,10 placed human rights and 
                                                           
Constitutionalization of IP Law—A Tale of Different Stories?, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FU�R 
GEISTIGES EIGENTUM INTELL. PROP. J. 383 (2015); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, 
The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the E.U. and the Funke Medien, 
Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, But Still Some Way to Go!, 
51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 282 (2020). 
7 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). 
8 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) 
(invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, the Lanham Act’s restrictions on the registration 
of the so-called “disparaging” and “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks). 
9 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. V. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) (“We have often recognized the 
monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature 
and must ultimately serve the public good.”) (emphasis added); Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954)) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’”) (emphasis added); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing 
that there are situations in which strict enforcement of copyright monopolies “would inhibit 
the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is intended to promote”); United 
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It is to be 
noted . . . that the reward to inventors is wholly secondary, the aim and purpose of patent 
statutes being limited by the Constitution to the promotion of the progress of science and 
useful arts.”); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) (“The 
patentee, like these other holders of an exclusive privilege granted in furtherance of a public 
policy [trademark and copyright holders], may not claim protection of his grant by the courts 
where it is being used to subvert that policy.”).  
10 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306/01). 
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fundamental freedoms at the very top of the hierarchy of norms.11 Since 
then, there has been a considerable rise in the use of human rights 
arguments in decisions on matters of intellectual property law in the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Luxemburg Court).12  
                                                           
11 On the consequences for intellectual property, see Christophe Geiger, Intellectual 
“Property” After the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in the New European 
Legal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 255 (2010); Christophe Geiger, The 
Construction of Intellectual Property in the European Union: Searching for Coherence, in 
1 CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 5 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2013). 
12 In the field of copyright and related rights, see: Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW 
GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=203686; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1950544; Case C-516/17, Spiegel 
Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=1951971; Case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Renckhoff (Aug. 7, 2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=204738&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1952679; Case C-484/14, 
McFadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Germany GmbH (Sept. 15, 2016), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183363&pageIndex=0&doclang=
EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1953592; Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. 
Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (Sept. 8, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183124&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=1954218; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157281&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1955429; Case C-314/12, UPC 
Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1955995; Case C-360/10, SABAM 
v. Netlog (Feb. 16, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1956594; 
Case C-277/10, Luksan v. Petrus van der Let (Feb. 9, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119322&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1957212; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags 
GmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-
11959; Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-00271.  
In the field of trademarks, see: Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion 
GmbH v. European Union Intellectual Property Office [EUIPO] (Feb. 27, 2020), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=223843&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2550080; Case C-580/13, Coty 
Germany GmbH v. Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165900&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1974194; Case T-587/13, Schwerdt v. OHIM - Iberamigo 
(cat&clean) (Jan. 21, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=161548&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
1975061; Case T-106/12, Cytochroma Development, Inc. v. OHIM (July 3, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139072&pageIndex=
6
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In addition, an accession of the E.U. to the ECtHR is envisaged,13 making 
ECtHR case law highly relevant for the E.U. This is important since the 
ECtHR has a longer tradition of applying human rights to intellectual 
property.14 As a result, European judges have already started to actively rely 
                                                           
0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1975452; Case T-542/10, 
XXXLutz Marken v. OHIM, (June 13, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=123788&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=1980694; Case T-526/09, PAKI Logistics GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. 
II-00346; Case T-232/10, Couture Tech Ltd. v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-06469.  
In the field of patents, see: Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE 
Corp. (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1983272; 
Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council of the European Union (May 5, 2015), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164093&pageIndex=0&doclang=
en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1984326; Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace 
eV, 2011 E.C.R. I-09821; Case C-127/00, Hässle AB v. Ratiopharm GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I-
14781; Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-07079.  
For an overview of CJEU case law touching on the intersection of fundamental 
rights and intellectual property, see Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?, 
supra note 5; Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual 
Property, supra note 5, at 115; Mylly, supra note 5, at 103; Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power 
Tools to the Acquis—The Court of Justice, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and European 
Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 144 (Christophe 
Geiger et al. eds., 2018); Stijan van Deursen & Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the 
Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1080 (2018). 
13 See Treaty on European Union art. 6(2), Feb. 7, 1992 as amended by Treaty of Lisbon art. 
1(8), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C306); European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
art. 59(2), Nov. 4, 1950, as amended by Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. 
Although the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of the E.U. accession to the ECHR 
(Opinion 2/13 of Dec. 18, 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the accession, which 
remains binding on the E.U. 
14 To give only a few examples of the amplitude of the phenomenon, the ECtHR has tested 
the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug for its compliance with the Convention’s 
property provision in Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 
44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep 70 (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-738. The 
court assessed the proportionality of the requirement to pay damages for a short news 
broadcast of copyrighted works with regards to a television channel’s right to freely 
communicate information in Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. 
No. 30262/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411. And finally, the court considered whether an 
unauthorized reproduction of the portrait and name of an ancestor in a brewery’s trademark 
was sufficient to cause distress by encroaching on the private and family life in ECtHR, 
Vorsina v. Russia (dec.), no. 66801/01, Feb. 5, 2004, CE:ECHR:2004:0205DEC006680101.  
The ECtHR has also examined the circumstances under which a non-authorized 
posting of the copyright-protected materials online can be shielded by the “infringers’” right 
to communicate information (and by the corresponding right of the public to receive it) in 
ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10. 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French) and ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. 
7
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on the case law of the ECtHR when deciding intellectual property cases,15 
and this tendency can only be expected to increase. 
This article reflects on these important developments through an 
examination of the ECtHR’s role in shaping European intellectual property 
standards. Surprisingly, most of the decisions rendered by the ECtHR have 
received relatively little comment, with the exception of a handful of cases.16 
                                                           
Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712.  
In the procedural context of the right to a fair trial, a violation of a reasoned judicial 
decision was established by the ECtHR in the national court’s failure to address the 
applicant’s argument relating to her trademark’s priority in ECtHR, Balani v. Spain, no. 
18064/91, Dec. 9, 1994, CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491, whereas, the proceedings 
decisive for the registration of the applicant’s design that lasted almost four years amounted 
to a violation of a reasonable time requirement in view of the total duration of protection of 
five years, counted from the date of filing an application in Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 
25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
46116.  
For a comprehensive overview of the intellectual property decisions of the ECtHR, 
see Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European 
Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9 (Christophe 
Geiger et al. eds., 2018). 
15 See, e.g., Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., Cours d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
July 18, 2001, [2001] EWCA Civ. 1142 (Fr.); Hugo v. Plon SA, Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 30, 2007, Bull. civ. I, No. 04-15.543 (Fr.), 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arret_n_98
50.html; Metall auf Metall, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 31, 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513 (Ger.); 
Peter Klasen v. Alix Malka, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e 
civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030600576; Bauret v. 
Koons, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e 
ch., Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15-01086 (Fr.); Brussels Commercial Court, Moët Hennessy 
Champagne Servs v. BVBA Cedric Art, Rechtbanken van Koophandel [Kh.] [commerce 
tribunal] Brussels, Apr. 12, 2018, No. A/17/02627, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/578b3fa715d5db22cadfadd3/t/5b360b61575d1f7d68e23004/1530268520602/damn+
perignon.pdf. 
16 Those concern, principally, a few cases on the protection of IP under the human right to 
property (in particular, ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 
11, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901) and a number of decisions on the 
intersection of copyright protection with freedom of expression (notably, Société Nationale 
de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 
1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411 (available only in French); ECtHR, 
Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 
(available only in French); and ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 
40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712). For comments on some 
of those cases, see, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual 
Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?]; Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and 
Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343 (Rochelle Dreyfuss, 
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The lack of attention is partially due to the fact that the court delivers some 
of its decisions, including in the sphere of IP, only in French. Despite the 
relative lack of doctrinal attention, the ECtHR’s concern regarding the 
conformity of IP standards with Europe’s catalogue of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms continues to grow.17 An increased involvement of the 
ECtHR in IP regulation has already influenced both national judges18 and 
another supranational European tribunal, the Court of Justice of the E.U. 
(CJEU),19 which calls for closer scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court’s approach 
to resolving IP disputes. Indeed, the case law of the Strasbourg Court 
provides important guidance on how the conflicts pertaining to the IP-
human rights intersection can be adjudicated by the lower courts. 
                                                           
et al. eds. 2001); Bogdan Dragos, Intellectual Property in the Case-Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CKS-
CERDOCT DOCTORAL SCHOOLS, CHALLENGES OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, 
BUCHAREST 93 (2011); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human 
Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 45 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014); Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of 
Expression and the Right to Information: Implications for Copyright, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331 (Christophe Geiger 
ed., 2015). 
17 See Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, 
supra note 5, at 115; see also Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension 
at EU Level, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27 (Estelle 
Derclaye ed., 2009). 
18 See, e.g., Metall auf Metall, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 31, 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13, DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160531.1bvr158513 (Ger.); 
Klasen v. Malka, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., May 
15, 2015, Bull. Civ. I, No. 13-27391 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030600576; HR april 3, 
2015, NJ 2015/183, m.nt. BB (GS Media BV/Sanoma Media Netherlands BV) (Neth.), 
paras. 5.2.5–5.2.6, https://e-justice.europa.eu/ecli/NL001/nl/ECLI:NL:HR:2015:841.html? 
index=0&ascending=false&lang=en; England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division), 
Rocknroll v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2013] EWHC (Ch) 24 [42] (Eng.); GHDHA 
Amsterdam 4 mei 2011, KG ZA 11-294 2011 389526 (Plesner/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) 
(Neth.), paras. 4.2–4.3. 
19 See, e.g., Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
para. 74 (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
203686; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 58 (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1951971; Case C-280/15, Nikolajeva 
v. Multi Protect OÜ, para. 43 (June 22, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=180686&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&d
ir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2285791; Case T-106/12, Cytochroma Development, Inc. v. 
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This article provides the first attempt to give a comprehensive 
overview of the ECtHR case law on IP.20 It starts with the right to a property 
framework for intellectual property and the protection it affords to the 
economic interests of IP holders (Part II). The article then proceeds to the 
instances of alleged interference of IP protection with other rights 
guaranteed by the Convention. This includes, first and foremost, the right 
to freedom of expression and information, frequently invoked by the user 
community as a counterweight to certain over-expansionist tendencies in IP 
protection (Part III). It will be demonstrated, however, that freedom of 
expression can serve as a basis not only for the claims of the so-called 
“infringers,” but also for those of the (actual or potential) IP holders 
themselves. The most salient examples are freedom of expression claims of 
trademark applicants regarding the restrictions on the registration of 
trademarks that are considered immoral, offensive, or otherwise against 
public order. Part IV, subsequently, focuses on the rarer examples of IP 
interaction with the right to privacy and is mainly reduced to questions of 
exercising remedies for IP infringement and certain, largely theoretical, 
arguments supporting the protection of moral rights under the scope of 
privacy rights. Furthermore, the right to non-discrimination—which gave rise 
to disputes involving restrictions imposed on some types of business by 
national broadcasting and copyright legislation and disputes concerning the 
different nature of patent appeal proceedings—merits a separate 
examination in Part V. A range of procedural guarantees, such as the right 
of access to courts, finality of court decisions, the tribunal’s independence 
and impartiality, reasonable duration of proceedings, and many others that 
had been considered by the ECtHR in IP proceedings, are analyzed in the 
last Part of the article (Part VI). Lastly, this article ends with some 
concluding observations. 
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR THE 
                                                           
20 Those (not many) doctrinal sources devoted to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on IP matters 
often concentrate on a specific Convention right of relevance for IP protection, such as the 
right to property, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, or the right to 
freedom of expression and information, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16. Other sources, even 
when examining several Convention provisions of relevance for IP, do not cover them all, 
providing an analysis only from the perspective of IP owners (and not users), see Dragos, 
supra note 16; David S. Welkowitz, Privatizing Human Rights? Creating Intellectual 
Property Rights from Human Rights Principles, 46 AKRON L. REV. 675 (2013), or 
concentrating on the impact of Convention rights on a particular jurisdiction, see Timothy 
Pinto, The Influence of the European Convention on Human Rights in Intellectual Property 
Rights, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209, 217 (2002). 
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PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF IP HOLDERS 
As mentioned already, in the United States, intellectual property is 
subject to the “Progress of Science and Useful Arts” clause of Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution. In this sense, the U.S. 
Constitution’s approach to intellectual property is similar to that taken in 
the international instruments for human rights protection such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)21 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).22 Notably, 
both Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR place 
intellectual property protection within the context of the freedom of the arts 
and sciences.23 
Neither the Progress of Science and useful Arts clause of the U.S. 
Constitution nor Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR 
explicitly mention the right to property, arguably making other means of 
protection equally conceivable.24 By contrast, the European system of 
human rights protection unequivocally subjects intellectual property to the 
property regime. The E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights,25 for instance, 
explicitly places intellectual property within the general provision on the 
                                                           
21 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
22 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
23 For further analysis of these provisions, see, e.g., ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BEYOND 110 (2007); Caterina Sganga, Right to Culture and Copyright: 
Participation and Access, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 560; Lea Shaver and Caterina Sganga, The Right 
to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637 
(2010). Additionally, see the two consecutive reports by Farida Shaheed (the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights) on intellectual property policies and the right to 
science and culture, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014) and U.N. Doc. A/70/279 
(Aug. 4, 2015). For an examination of domestic and international approaches to 
constitutional protection of intellectual property via its inclusion within, for example, the 
general right to property, freedom of the arts and sciences, or even freedom of expression, 
see Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights 
Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 661. 
24 See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 17: 
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the 
Author, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006); see also Christophe Geiger, 
Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and International) Intellectual 
Property Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223, 
227 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012). 
25 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
391–407. 
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right to property in Article 17 of the Charter.26 Although the ECHR makes 
no mention of IP, the ECtHR and its former Commission of Human 
Rights27 have been gradually attaching different IP rights to the ECHR’s 
property provision in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.28 Moreover, not only was 
the acquired intellectual property title deemed protected but so were the 
applications for its registration.29 An overview of the Convention case law on 
the right to property makes it possible to distinguish three categories of 
cases: IP disputes originating from a direct state action (Section II.A); IP 
disputes between private parties that can still be attributed to the state by 
virtue of the Convention’s horizontal effect (Section II.B); and claims 
against international organizations, notably, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) (Section II.C).30 
A. Negative Aspect: Direct State Interference with the Exercise of IP 
                                                           
26 On the IP clause of the E.U. Charter, see Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall 
Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009); 
Geiger, Intellectual “Property” After the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 11. 
27 The European Commission of Human Rights (Eur. Comm’n H.R.) was the ECHR body 
abolished in 1998 and had been, until then, entrusted with decisions on the admissibility of 
applications to the Strasbourg Court. See Protocol 11 to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control 
Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, 1994 E.T.S. 155. 
28 In the field of patent law, see: Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 
12633/87, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70 (1990), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng?i=001-738; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97, 94-B Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 136, 145, para. 2 (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
4408.  
In the field of copyright, see: A.D. v. Netherlands, App. No. 21962/93, para. 3 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 11, 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2600; Aral v. 
Turkey, App. No. 24563/94, para. 4 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064; ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, 
May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (available only in French); ECtHR, 
Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 3; ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03, 
Jan. 29, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703, para. 34; ECtHR, SC Editura 
Orizonturi SRL v. Romania, no. 15872/03, May 13, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203 (available only in French), para. 70; ECtHR, SIA 
AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016, CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205, 
para. 41. 
In the field of trademarks, see: ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal [GC], 
no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 72; ECtHR, 
Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 21770/05, Sept. 18, 
2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904, para. 1. 
29 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 78. 
30 For an excellent analysis of the ECHR’s law on the right to property in its application to 
intellectual property, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16. 
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The first category of property-as-a-basis-for-IP cases is the most 
“traditional” insofar as this category pertains to allegations of interference 
with the applicants’ intellectual property rights directly attributable to states 
(the only parties accountable under the Convention). In the IP context, the 
following types of disputes originating in a direct state action were brought 
to the attention of Convention organs: non-recognition of (Section II.A.1) 
or refusal to restore the applicant’s IP entitlement (Section II.A.2) and a 
more specific issue pertaining to compulsory licensing (Section II.A.3). 
1. Non-Recognition of an Applicant’s IP Entitlement 
The first type of dispute resulting from a direct state action—non-
recognition of the applicant’s IP entitlement under the domestic legal 
system—was considered at length for the first time in 2005 in the case of 
Dima v. Romania.31 The applicant in that case was a graphic designer who 
had worked in the studio of Plastic Arts of the Romanian Defense Ministry. 
After the fall of the communist regime in December 1989, Romanian 
authorities decided to adopt a new state emblem, and a public competition 
was launched. The design project prepared by the applicant was chosen over 
many other submissions, and the applicant was appointed to work with two 
other experts in history and heraldry on the model of a new emblem. 
Approved by the Romanian Parliament, the design proposed by the 
applicant was ratified by the Law on the State Emblem and Seal and 
published in the Official Journal of Romania. The applicant’s name 
appeared in that journal, bearing the mention “graphic designer.” For an 
unspecified reason, the applicant had never, however, been remunerated 
for his work.  
Seeking to obtain compensation and to assert copyright in his 
design, the applicant brought several lawsuits against the companies that had 
reproduced and distributed the state emblem and seal—namely, the two 
private companies and one state enterprise responsible for the minting of 
Romanian coins. The applicant’s claims were, nevertheless, rejected in all 
instances on the grounds that copyright in the design subsisted in the 
Romanian Parliament who had commissioned the work and that, in any 
event, the state emblem and seal could not be subject to copyright. The trial 
and appellate courts relied on the new Copyright Law of 1996, which, unlike 
the law in force at the time of the design’s creation, explicitly excluded state 
symbols from copyrightable subject matter. The applicant appealed to the 
                                                           
31 ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (available only in French). For an assessment of this 
case, see Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 14–18; Dragos, supra note 
16, at 96, 100–01. 
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Romanian Supreme Court of Justice on points of law, challenging the 
retroactive application of the 1996 Law to his situation. The Romanian 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, essentially basing its argument—unlike 
the lower courts—on the 1956 Decree on Copyright that was in force at the 
time the models were designed by the applicant. It reasoned that, even in 
the absence of explicit exclusion of state symbols from copyrightable subject 
matter, the 1956 Decree did not provide that the state emblem and seal 
could be copyrighted because the Decree used the positive enumeration 
technique in defining the scope of protection. 
The applicant contested the Romanian Supreme Court’s finding 
before the ECtHR. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of 
property) to the Convention, he complained that the domestic courts’ 
interpretation of national copyright laws deprived him of his copyright in 
the design of the state emblem and seal and from the income he could have 
obtained by exploiting his work as an author. He maintained that his 
copyright arose from the moment he created the design or, at the latest, 
from the moment he was mentioned as an author in the Official Journal of 
Romania. He further asserted that even in the event of a qualifying contract, 
this would not prevent the creation of a work and copyright ownership. 
The Strasbourg Court first stated that intellectual property was 
covered by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and, therefore, 
found it appropriate to examine whether the applicant had, in this respect, 
“possession” or at least a “legitimate expectation” of acquiring 
“possession.”32 Concerning the latter point, the Strasbourg Court, 
nonetheless, abstained from interfering with the domestic courts’ reasoning 
and declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible ratione materiae—that 
is, due to the applicant’s failure to prove that the right claimed by him was 
recognized, at least arguably, under Romanian law.33 The Strasbourg Court 
noted that it was for the national courts to determine the disputes on the 
existence or scope of copyright, stressing in particular that at no point in the 
domestic proceedings did those courts find in favor of the applicant.34 Nor 
was there any favorable case law allowing the applicant to prove that it was 
possible to acquire copyright in the designs of the state emblem and seal.35 
Moreover, the Romanian Supreme Court’s interpretation of national 
copyright laws excluded that possibility. It, therefore, followed that the 
applicant did not have “possession” or at least a “legitimate expectation” of 
acquiring “possession” in terms of the Convention.36 In particular, no 
                                                           
32 ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526
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“legitimate expectation” could be said to arise where there was a dispute as 
to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law, and the 
applicant’s submissions were subsequently rejected by the national courts.37 
In this light, with regard to the limited power of the Strasbourg Court to 
review alleged errors of fact or law committed by the national courts, the 
court found that Romanian Supreme Court’s decision in the applicant’s case 
did not appear arbitrary.38 
However, in a similar dispute three years later, the Strasbourg Court 
reached an opposite conclusion. The case at issue, Bălan v. Moldova,39 
concerned the refusal of Moldovan courts to compensate the applicant for 
unauthorized use of a photograph by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a 
background for national identity cards. Unlike Dima, in Bălan, the 
applicant’s authorship was acknowledged by the domestic courts that also 
awarded him some compensation.40 Yet, the applicant’s request for a 
contract for future use of the photograph and the claim for compensation 
for the continued unlawful use of it were, after a series of court decisions, 
rejected by the country’s supreme court.41 The Moldovan Supreme Court 
reasoned that the applicant had failed to request the prohibition of any 
further use and that identity cards, as official documents, could not be 
subject to copyright.42 
The Strasbourg Court, to which the case was referred thereafter, 
found that the refusal of the domestic courts to award the applicant 
compensation following the breach of his copyright amounted to a violation 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.43 First, the Strasbourg Court 
took note of the fact that the applicant’s rights in the photograph had been 
recognized by the domestic courts in a final judgment and, therefore, 
constituted a “possession” within the meaning of the ECHR’s property 
provision.44 As to the supreme court’s argument that identity cards could not 
be subject to copyright, the Strasbourg Court pointed to the distinction in 
the relevant national law between the authors’ rights with respect to their 
works and the property rights over the material object in which their creation 
                                                           
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03, Jan. 29, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703. For a discussion of this case, see HELFER & AUSTIN, 
supra note 5, at 212–13; Dragos, supra note 16, at 105; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, 
Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights Law: Approaches of European Courts to 
Address Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 70, 80–82, 87. 
40 ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03, para. 48. 
41 Id. paras. 15–16. 
42 Id. para. 17. 
43 Id. para. 46. 
44 Id. paras. 34–36. 
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was embodied.45 Since the Moldovan Supreme Court only referred to 
identity cards, and not to the photograph taken by the applicant, its finding 
that identity cards could not be subject to copyright had no bearing on the 
applicant’s copyright as applied to his photograph.46  
Insofar as it concerned the applicant’s failure to ask the courts to 
prohibit the use of his work, the Strasbourg Court believed that the 
impugned use of the photograph, even in the absence of the applicant’s 
petition, posed an interference with his right.47 This was because the illegal 
character of the unauthorized use was not conditioned in law by any 
particular act of the copyright owner, “such as the request for a court 
injunction against such use.”48 Finally, on the subject of proportionality, the 
Court concluded that the applicant’s interest in the protection of his 
copyright outweighed the community interest in issuing identity cards, as the 
latter aim could have been reached in a variety of ways not involving the 
breach of the applicant’s IP rights.49 
An additional case concerning the non-recognition of an applicant’s 
IP entitlement has recently come up before the Strasbourg Court; this time 
in the context of trademark protection. The case of Kamoy Radyo 
Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, decided in April 
2019,50 concerned a Turkish media company. In 1999, a company affiliated 
with the applicant began publishing a newspaper, Özlenen Gazete Vatan, 
after having registered the name as a trademark.51 However, soon after, it 
closed for financial reasons. In 2002, another company, Bağımsız 
Gazetecilik Yayıncılık A.Ş., began publishing a newspaper called Vatan, 
which is what prompted the affiliated company to initiate the trademark 
infringement proceedings. The trademark was later transferred to the 
applicant company and thus it became a party to the proceedings.52  
The first-instance court rejected the applicant’s trademark 
protection claim, arguing that the newspaper Vatan had been published 
since 1975 and had become well-known prior to the applicant company’s 
application for its registration as a trademark.53 The court further relied on 
                                                           
45 Id. para. 35. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. paras. 38–40. 
48 Id. para. 38. 
49 Id. para. 45. Note that a similar type of claim on the alleged violation by public authorities 
of the applicant’s copyright on the design drawings for the National Bank’s commemorative 
coins is currently pending before the Strasbourg Court. ECtHR, AsDAC v. Republic of 
Moldova, no. 47384/07, communicated on Jan. 17, 2013. 
50 ECtHR, Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, no. 
19965/06, Apr. 16, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0416JUD001996506. 
51 Id. paras. 5–6.  
52 Id. paras. 9–10.  
53 Id. para. 12.  
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section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, which came into force 
during the proceedings in November 2003.54 According to that law, 
publishers of periodicals could not be prevented from publishing on the 
basis of trademark protection. The judgment was upheld on appeal.55 
Separately, the Turkish Constitutional Court, in 2008, annulled section 
31(2) of the Patent Institute Act, finding that it did not conform to the 
property rights guaranteed by the Turkish Constitution.56 
Before the Strasbourg Court, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
(protection of property), the applicant company complained of an unlawful 
restriction on the use of its trademark because of the retroactive application 
of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, which had protected the 
other party in the dispute.57 The Strasbourg Court held that the applicant 
company had had possession within the meaning of the Convention and not 
just a legitimate expectation of obtaining a property right.58 There had also 
been an interference with that possession due to the application of section 
31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act.59 In addition, the subsequent 
annulment of this provision by the Turkish Constitutional Court rendered 
the protection of trademarks meaningless, was not in the public interest, and 
violated the applicant’s right to property.60 The Turkish government failed 
to make any arguments supporting the existence of a legitimate aim for the 
piece of legislation in question.61 Nor could it put forward any justification 
on general interest grounds for the way the legal dispute between the 
companies had been settled by the retroactive application of the law.62 
Accordingly, the government could not prove that the interference with the 
applicant company’s property rights had served a public interest. As a result, 
there was a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) 
to the Convention.63 
2. Refusal to Restore an IP Title 
The state’s refusal to restore a previously recognized IP title, as a 
second instance of direct state action, was at stake in the case of University 
of Illinois Foundation v. Netherlands.64 
                                                           
54 Id. 
55 Id. paras. 13–15.  
56 Id. para. 17.  
57 Id. para. 13.  
58 Id. paras. 37–38. 
59 Id. para. 42. 
60 Id. para. 48. 
61 Id. para. 50. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. paras. 51–52. 
64 Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2, 
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}.  
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The case concerned the lapse of a patent granted by the Dutch Patent 
Council as a result of the applicant’s failure to pay a patent maintenance fee 
on time. The Dutch representative had failed to notify the applicant, an 
American corporate body, that the annual fee had not been paid due to a 
technical error and to remind them to pay it within a six-month period after 
the deadline. By the time the applicant discovered the oversight, the patent 
had already lapsed. The Dutch Patent Council rejected the applicant’s 
request for restoration of the patent due to a provision in the Dutch Patent 
Act, which prevented applicants from requesting restoration when the loss 
of rights resulted from late payments and an extended payment period 
existed. 
Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of 
the ECHR, the applicant complained that it had been deprived of its 
possessions and that the public interest involved in the lapse of its patent 
was not proportionate to the applicant’s interest. This assertion was, 
however, rejected by the European Commission of Human Rights. It 
reasoned that the right to have the patent restored had no legal basis in either 
Dutch patent law or in the ECHR itself.65 Accordingly, its recognition 
“would essentially entail a right to acquire property,66 which [was] not 
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”67 The ruling of the Commission 
might seem quite radical. Nevertheless, it is rather old (rendered in 1988), 
and the position of the court might be different today if a similar case were 
brought before it. As the ECtHR has made clear on numerous occasions, 
the ECHR is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”68 A recent example from Belgium is instructive in 
this regard. In 2014, the Belgian Constitutional Court found that revoking a 
patent due to a failure to provide a translation within the strict three-month 
deadline and without the possibility of restoration was a disproportionate 
deprivation of property in view of the legislators’ aim to inform the public 
on the scope of the patent and a non-justified damage to the right to property 
of the patent holder.69 Such a sanction was, accordingly, held to be contrary 
to the Belgian Constitution’s property provision (Article 16) when read in 
conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 
                                                           
65 Id. para. 1. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 ECtHR, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, July 28, 1999, 
CE:ECHR:1999:0728JUD002580394, para. 101; see also ECtHR, Matthews v. United 
Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, Feb. 18, 1999, CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002483394, para. 
39; ECtHR, Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], no. 14939/03, Feb. 10, 2009, 
CE:ECHR:2009:0210JUD001493903, para. 80. 
69 BioPheresis Techs. Inc. v. Belgium, Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court], 
No. 3/2014 (Jan. 16, 2014) (Belg.) (available in French), https://www.const-court.be/public/
f/2014/2014-003f.pdf. 
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3. Compulsory Licensing 
A different category of disputes involving direct state action 
revolved around the grant of compulsory licenses for the use of protected 
works. The question of whether such a grant amounts to an unjustified 
interference with the rightsholder’s possessions was raised before 
Convention institutions twice. 
The first case, Smith Kline v. Netherlands,70 dates back to 1990. It 
concerned a grant of a compulsory license by the Dutch Patent Office for 
the applicant company’s (the dominant patent holder) patented drug to the 
owner of a dependent patent after the former refused to grant such a license. 
Although the Commission found that the decisions of the Dutch 
Patent Office conferring a compulsory license for the applicant’s patent 
constituted a control of the use of property,71 the Commission nevertheless 
considered that such control was lawful and pursued the legitimate aim of 
encouraging technological and economic development.72 As for 
proportionality, the Commission observed that: 
[T]he provision only comes into effect where such licence is 
necessary for the working of a patent of the same or later date and 
the licence should be limited to what is required for the working 
of the patent. Further, the owner of the dominant patent is 
entitled to royalties in respect of each compulsory licence granted 
under the legislation and receives reciprocal rights under the 
dependent patent. While the Commission recalls that the Patent 
Office is not required to investigate in each particular case 
whether the grant of the compulsory licence is necessary in the 
general interest, the Commission finds that the framework 
imposed by the legislation is intended to prevent abuse of 
monopoly situations and encourage development and that this 
method of pursuing that aim falls within the margin of 
appreciation accorded to the Contracting State. The Commission 
accordingly finds that the control of use in the circumstances of 
this case did not fail to strike a fair balance between the interests 
of the applicant company and the general interest and is in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
. . . to the Convention.73 
                                                           
70 Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70 (1990), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12633/87"], 
"itemid":["001-738"]}. For a discussion of this case, see Helfer, The New Innovation 
Frontier?, supra note 16, at 12–13, 27–28, 32–35; Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 39, at 12. 
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The second occasion on which compulsory licensing was tested for 
its compliance with the Convention’s property provision arose very 
recently—in July 2016—and concerned the Latvian collective rights 
management organization (SIA AKKA/LAA). The SIA AKKA/LAA filed 
a complaint74 because it was ordered by national courts to conclude licensing 
agreements for the use of musical works of the authors it represented with 
two domestic broadcasters.75 According to the applicant organization, the 
national courts’ orders amounted to an unjustified restriction on the 
exclusive rights of the authors represented by SIA AKKA/LAA, which 
violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the ECHR.76 
The ECtHR disagreed, holding that there had been no violation of 
the named provision.77 It first rejected the Latvian Government’s contention 
that the applicant organization could not claim to be a victim of a measure 
that infringed the rights guaranteed by the ECHR to its members.78 
According to the court, once the domestic legal order attributed the 
protection of the authors’ rights to an organization founded by the authors 
for this purpose and vested the organization with independent rights 
transferred from the authors, that organization must be regarded as a victim 
of a measure affecting these rights.79 Next, the ECtHR established that SIA 
AKKA/LAA was disposed of its “possessions”—that is, the rights transferred 
to it by its members80—and that those possessions had been interfered with 
by the domestic courts.81  
                                                           
74 ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205. For more on this case, see PRESS UNIT OF THE 
ECTHR, FACTSHEET—NEW TECHNOLOGIES 19 (Feb. 2020), http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/FS_New_technologies_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W3V-8EN3].  
75 ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205, para. 38. When concluding that it was within their 
competence to set the royalty rate, the national courts relied on Article 11bis of the Berne 
Convention (setting out provisions on broadcasting and related rights), section 5 of the 
Latvian Civil Procedures Law of October 14, 1998 (providing that a judge must be guided 
by the general principles of law and justice when a court is called upon to adjudicate on its 
own discretion or when exceptional circumstances have to be taken into account), and 
section 41 of the Latvian Copyright Law of April 6, 2000 (Autortiesību likums) (part three 
of this section providing that if the license agreement does not set out the royalty rate, the 
latter shall be decided by the domestic courts). Id. para. 64. Latvian Civil Procedures and 
Copyright Laws are available, with English translation by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=LV 
[https://perma.cc/5FPV-67GW]. 
76 ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA v. Latvia, no. 562/05, July 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD000056205, para. 38. 
77 Id. para. 81. 
78 Id. paras. 43, 46, 50. 
79 Id. para. 49. 
80 Id. para. 55. 
81 Id. para. 59. 
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As to the lawfulness of such interference, the court was satisfied that 
the domestic courts’ competence to deal with the issue had some basis in 
domestic and international copyright law.82 The court also found that the 
measures at issue pursued a legitimate aim, as they served both the radio 
stations’ interest in obtaining a license to legally broadcast the musical works 
in question and the public interest in having access to those works.83 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court took into account that “over an extended 
period of time protected works were being broadcast without a valid licence, 
and that this situation was to a certain extent due to the applicant 
organisation’s limited efficiency in carrying out negotiations with the 
defendants.”84  
Finally, on the question of proportionality, the court considered 
whether the national courts had struck a fair balance between a legitimate 
aim and the rights of the collective society to equitable remuneration. In this 
regard, the court first noted that, in setting the royalty rate, the domestic 
courts relied on the terms already negotiated by the parties who had some 
time to reach an agreement.85 Second, it noted that banning the broadcast 
would not have suited the interests of copyright holders seeking to obtain 
maximum profit from the exploitation of musical works.86 The third and 
final consideration for the ECtHR was the fact that the domestic courts’ 
orders for the parties to enter into a licensing agreement were limited in 
scope and time.87 
*** 
This overview of Convention cases pertaining to direct state 
interference in the exercise of IP rights demonstrates that the ECtHR leaves 
Member States considerable discretion in regulating intellectual property 
disputes.88 Unless IP rights are given domestic recognition in the form of a 
legislative act or a court decision, the ECtHR will be reluctant to accept that 
the claimed right falls within the Convention’s property provision. In other 
words, the court will hesitate to find that any substantive interest protected 
by the Convention is conferred on the applicant. In such cases, the IP claim 
brought under Article 1 of the First Protocol is likely to be rejected ratione 
                                                           
82 Id. paras. 64–66. 
83 Id. paras. 69–71. 
84 Id. para. 70. 
85 Id. para. 77. 
86 Id. para. 78. 
87 Id. para. 79. 
88 See Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the 
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 132. 
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materiae. This, as has been shown, was the case in Dima v. Romania89 and 
University of Illinois Foundation.90 
Even if the claimed interest has a substantive basis, and an 
interference with the applicant’s IP right can be established, a wide margin 
of appreciation is left to Member States to decide how they will balance their 
interest in protecting IP with other interests of general importance for 
society. This would include encouraging technological and economic 
development or wider access to musical works, as was the case, respectively, 
in Smith Kline and SIA AKKA/LAA. 
It is important to bear in mind that the Convention’s property 
protection is far from absolute91 and that the Strasbourg Court rarely 
interferes with the findings of the national courts. Only in situations of 
blatant violations or retroactive applications of law, such as those in Bălan 
v. Moldova92 and Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. 
v. Turkey93 respectively, might the court hold Article 1 of the First Protocol 
infringed. For those claims to succeed, however, it is important that the 
applicants clearly substantiate their property claims (as they have the burden 
of proof) and that the recognition of their rights can be at least somewhat 
traced to the national level. 
B. Positive Aspect: State Failure to Regulate IP Disputes Between Private 
Parties 
Although the Strasbourg Court may not, as a general rule, receive 
applications against private parties, “the obligation to secure the effective 
exercise of Convention rights may involve positive obligations of a State, and 
. . . these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”94 This extension 
of the Convention’s reach to disputes between private actors (also known as 
                                                           
89 ECtHR, Dima v. Romania, no. 58472/00, Nov. 16, 2006, 
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200. 
90 Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2, 
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}. 
91 See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics 
Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 153–76 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013); Geiger, supra note 
23. 
92 ECtHR, Bălan v. Moldova, no. 19247/03, Jan. 29, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703. 
93 ECtHR, Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayıncılık ve Organizasyon A.Ş. v. Turkey, no. 
19965/06, Apr. 16, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0416JUD001996506. 
94 J.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19173/91 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 8, 1993), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1477. 
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a “horizontal effect” of the Convention95) may take place, for example, when 
the national legislation does not meet the requirements of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention or when the losses of one of the parties 
to the (essentially private) proceedings are caused by arbitrary 
determinations of the state’s judicial bodies. In both types of cases, the 
national judicial decisions are regarded as a form of state action.96 
In relation to intellectual property proceedings, the Strasbourg 
Court and its former Commission had to consider allegations of Article 1 
Protocol No. 1 violations in three categories of cases originating in private-
party litigation: contractual disputes (Section II.B.1), infringement disputes 
and claims for royalties (Section II.B.2), and disputes over ownership of an 
IP title (Section II.B.3). 
1. Contractual Disputes 
A contractual intellectual property dispute—the first in the private-
party type of conflict—was the subject of the case of Aral v. Turkey.97 The 
case concerned a copyright infringement suit over artistic material created 
by the applicants for certain magazines. The trial court decided that all 
financial rights over the artistic material created by the applicants during 
their contract with the initial owner of the magazines belonged to the 
entrepreneur who subsequently purchased those magazines (H.E.A.), and, 
as a result, those materials could not be published without H.E.A.’s 
permission. The decision was based on the applicants’ contract with 
H.E.A.’s predecessor and on the relevant provisions of the Turkish Law on 
Intellectual and Artistic Works,98 which, at the material time, recognized a 
certain form of the work for hire doctrine. In particular, article 8, paragraph 
2 of that Law provided that “[u]nless otherwise understood by special 
contract between them or the content of the work, the owner of the financial 
rights of the works created by the officials, servants and workers in conduct 
of their job is the person employing or assigning them.”99 Nevertheless, the 
                                                           
95 See JEAN-FRANCOIS AKANDJI-KOMBE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS, NO. 7, at 14–15 (2007), 
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff4d [https://perma.cc/B79B-FZVF]. 
96 See Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 28. 
97 Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064. For commentary on this case, see Helfer, The 
New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 28–29; Dragos, supra note 16, at 97–98. 
98 Turkish Law No. 5846 of 5 December 1951 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (last 
amended by Law No. 4110 of 7 June 1995) (English translation from Turkish by the WIPO), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129904 [https://perma.cc/96L3-WASD]. 
99 Id. Note that the current version of this law no longer contains this provision. See Law No. 
5846 of 5 December 1951 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (amended up to Law No. 6552 
of 10 September 2014) (English translation by the WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=440050 [https://perma.cc/9WRK-47P7].  
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trial court allowed the applicants to continue using their characters in other 
magazines and newspapers but limited such use to other subjects and 
stories. The applicants’ subsequent attempts to overturn this decision were 
unsuccessful. 
In response to the applicants’ challenge of the domestic courts’ 
refusal to recognize the applicants’ ownership in the artistic material, the 
European Commission of Human Rights observed that: 
[T]here is no interference with the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions when, pursuant to the domestic 
law and a contract regulating the relationship between the 
parties, a judge orders one party to that contract to 
surrender a possession to another, unless it arbitrarily and 
unjustly deprives that person of property in favour of 
another . . . .100 
Turning to the circumstances of the case before it, the Commission noted 
that: 
[T]he domestic courts interpreted the domestic law in the light of 
the contract between the applicants and H.E.A. They decided 
that the owner of the artistic materials, in particular, the pictures, 
cartoons, films etc., which were published or which were 
unpublished but held in the archives of the magazines ‘Girgir’ and 
‘Firt’, was H.E.A. Furthermore, the courts decided that the 
applicants could continue to draw the same characters which they 
had drawn and published in the two magazines during the period 
of their contract, but in association with other subjects and stories, 
in other magazines or newspapers.101 
On this basis, the Commission found “no element in the case which 
would allow it to conclude that the courts acted in an arbitrary or 
unreasonable manner.”102 Accordingly, the Commission did not establish 
any shortcomings attributable to the State in this respect.103 
Just a few months later, the Commission again had to resolve a 
contractual dispute. This time, the dispute involved a civil claim brought by 
applicants who owned legally protected industrial property and construction 
secrets in Germany. The applicants sought damages from an Italian 
company to which they licensed their trade secrets. The applicants alleged 
a breached licensing contract and unauthorized use of transferred 
knowledge.104 The domestic courts dismissed the claim on the grounds of 
                                                           




103 Id. (holding that the complaint must be rejected because it was “manifestly ill-founded”). 
104 G.D. & M. v. Germany, App. No. 29818/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 20, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4256. 
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intentional deception, finding that the applicants had been aware of the 
impossibility of obtaining legal protection of the technology at stake in Italy. 
The applicants appealed the dismissal to the ECtHR, claiming that the 
domestic courts’ decisions amounted to a breach of their property rights, 
arguing that trade secrets of a high commercial value had been transferred 
to the defendant. 
The Commission found that, in the course of the domestic judicial 
proceedings, the applicants failed to prove that their license had any 
commercial value.105 Accordingly, and insofar as their property claim had 
never been recognized by the domestic courts, the impugned decisions of 
the German courts “could not have the effect of depriving [the applicants] 
of a possession which they owned.”106 Consequently, “the applicants ha[d] 
not shown that they ha[d] the right referred to,” and their complaint under 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.107 
Despite the brevity of the Commission’s analysis in the above cases, 
they nevertheless demonstrate the capability of the Convention organs to 
horizontally extend (even if cautiously) the scope of human-rights review to 
private-party disputes pertaining to contractual transfer of IP ownership. 
Occasionally, however, the Strasbourg Court has rejected 
applications that alleged a violation of the Convention’s property provision 
without directly involving state actors. For example, it refused to examine 
the merits of an Article 1 Protocol No. 1 claim concerning non-enforcement 
of a judgment that obliged a private company that was previously owned by 
the state to pay royalties to a patent holder.108 According to the court, since 
the debtor enterprise was a private company, the state was absolved of 
responsibility for its acts: 
The Court has no jurisdiction to consider applications directed 
against private individuals or businesses . . . . [I]n this particular 
case the judgment against the enterprise could not be enforced 
due to the enterprise’s lack of funds and its subsequent 
bankruptcy. However, the State is not answerable under the 
Convention for that.109 
2. Infringement Disputes and Claims for Royalties 
In the second type of property dispute between private parties—
those pertaining to infringement claims and claims for royalties—the 
                                                           
105 Id. para. 1. 
106 Id. para. 2. 
107 Id. 
108 ECtHR, Mihăilescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 47748/99, Aug. 26, 2003, 
CE:ECHR:2003:0826DEC004774899. 
109 Id. (rejecting the complaint as “manifestly ill-founded”). 
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Strasbourg Court was similarly cautious to intervene in domestic courts’ 
interpretation of intellectual property issues. One example is the case of 
Melnychuk v. Ukraine.110 In that case, the applicant complained about the 
refusal of the local newspaper, which published critical reviews of his book, 
to also publish the applicant’s reply to that criticism. Arguing that the 
newspaper’s refusal raised an issue under Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
of the ECHR, Mr. Melnychuk also maintained that the critical reviews 
infringed his copyright. However, he did not advance any possible basis for 
this claim, and, consequently, the national courts dismissed the claim as 
“unsubstantiated.” The applicant appealed to the ECtHR—relying, in 
addition to Article 10, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR—but, 
once again, without explaining in what way the ECHR’s property provision 
was breached. 
The ECtHR declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded.111 Having reiterated that intellectual property is 
protected in principle by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the court, nevertheless, 
noted that the mere “fact that the State, through its judicial system, provided 
a forum for the determination of the applicant’s rights and obligations does 
not automatically engage its responsibility under Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1.”112 Referring to the applicant’s failure to substantiate his copyright 
infringement claim, the ECtHR observed that “the national courts 
proceeded in accordance with domestic law, giving full reasons for their 
decisions” to dismiss the applicant’s complaint.113 “Thus, their assessment 
was not flawed by arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness contrary to 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”114 
Unlike Melnychuk, an interference with the Convention’s property 
provision was established two years later in a dispute over the registration of 
domain names that allegedly violated the trademark rights of others.115 In 
that case, the applicant company, Paeffgen Gmbh, was engaged in e-
commerce and held several thousand internet domain names registered by 
the competent authority. According to the terms of the domain contracts 
with the registration authority, it was up to the domain holder to verify 
whether the registration and use of the domains infringed the rights of 
others. Subsequently, other companies and private individuals brought 
                                                           
110 ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303. For a discussion of this case, see Helfer, The New 
Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
111 ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005, 




115 ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 
21770/05, Sept. 18, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904. For more on this case, see 
Dragos, supra note 16, at 105. 
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several sets of proceedings against the applicant, claiming that Paeffgen’s 
registration and use of certain domains breached their trademark rights 
and/or their rights to a business name.  
In all of those cases, the domestic courts found that the applicant 
company had unfairly taken advantage of the plaintiffs’ well-known 
denominations. As a result, the applicant was ordered to refrain from using 
or disposing of the domains in question and apply for their cancellation—a 
decision that Paeffgen further contested before the ECtHR. Paeffgen argued 
that the absolute prohibition on using the domain names and the duty to 
apply for their cancellation, instead of a duty to merely refrain from a 
specific infringement of the plaintiffs’ rights, disproportionately interfered 
with Paeffgen’s right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR. 
The Strasbourg Court agreed that the measure in question 
amounted to an interference with Paeffgen’s “possessions,” thereby 
recognizing that domain names benefit from the protection of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR.116 It observed, however, that such interference 
served to protect the trademark rights or other rights of third parties by 
effectively preventing unauthorized use to the detriment of the 
rightsholders.117 Although the domestic courts did not consider less 
restrictive measures to be sufficient, the Strasbourg Court found that the 
applicant company failed to demonstrate limited ways of using the domains 
in question without risking interference with the rights of others.118 The court 
observed that the applicant was aware that the domain name registration did 
not imply freedom from third-party claims.119 It also noted that, at the time 
of the domestic court proceedings, the applicant company had hardly used 
its domains.120 Thus, it followed that the domestic judicial orders were 
proportionate and had not excessively burdened the applicant.121 
Like the other types of disputes discussed above, the Strasbourg 
Court is likely to reject an applicant’s property claim originating from royalty 
claims if, at no point in domestic proceedings, domestic courts recognized 
that claim. It is on these grounds that the Strasbourg Court declined, for 
example, an action concerning a claim for royalties—which domestic courts 
had failed to decide for more than twelve years—from a limited liability 
                                                           
116 ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 





121 Id. (rejecting the complaint as “manifestly ill-founded”). 
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company for a furniture line the company had designed.122 In response to 
the applicant’s allegation that he was unable to use his property—the royalties 
due by the defendant—as a result of the domestic courts’ failure to decide 
on his action, the ECtHR found that the claims, not determined by a final 
court decision, did not amount to “possessions” attracting the guarantees of 
the Convention’s property provision.123 Accordingly, just as in the case of 
Dima discussed above, the complaint was declared inadmissible ratione 
materiae.124 
As can be seen, ECHR rulings concerning disputes in the sphere of 
IP infringement and claims for royalties have not provided adequate 
opportunities to determine how these types of cases can be approached 
from an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 perspective. Such analysis can, however, 
be expected soon in the pending case of Safarov v. Azerbaijan. The case 
concerns an unauthorized reproduction of the applicant’s book by a youth 
non-governmental organization (NGO) on the website of the NGO’s project 
on the history of Azerbaijan.125 When the applicant was informed of the 
infringement and requested the removal of his book from the website 
(which was done immediately), the book had already been downloaded 417 
times. The applicant brought a civil claim against the NGO, asking for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to compensate the loss he incurred 
as a result of the unauthorized reproduction of his book.  
The trial court dismissed the applicant’s claims by referring to 
Article 18 of the Azerbaijani Copyright Law,126 which permits the 
reproduction of copyrighted materials by libraries, archives, and educational 
institutions. The court further noted that the book had been removed from 
the website upon the applicant’s demand, and the applicant failed to prove 
that he had suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage. The applicant 
lodged an appeal against this decision, arguing that the trial court had failed 
to refer to any of the purposes exhaustively listed in Article 18 of the 
Azerbaijani Copyright Law.  
The appellate court rejected the applicant’s claim, repeating the 
reasoning of the first-instance court. The applicant’s appeal to the 
Azerbaijani Supreme Court was likewise dismissed. The supreme court 
reiterated the lower instances’ reasoning and additionally referenced Article 
15(3) of the Copyright Law, which states that once the lawfully published 
                                                           
122 ECtHR, Rapos v. Slovakia, no. 25763/02, May 20, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302. 
123 Id. para. 40. 
124 Id. 
125 ECtHR, Safarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 885/12, communicated on May 18, 2017. 
126 Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Copyright and Related Rights of 5 June 1996 
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copies of a book are sold, those copies can be further distributed without 
the author’s consent and without paying royalty to the author.  
The applicant then complained to the ECtHR, raising claims about 
the domestic court’s reasoning of their decisions under Article 6(1) (fair 
trial) of the ECHR and about the state’s failure to protect his copyright, in 
alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to 
the ECHR. In May 2017, both claims were communicated to the 
Azerbaijani Government, which is an indication that the case is likely to be 
examined on the merits, instead of being rejected at the point of 
admissibility review. 
3. Disputes over Ownership of An IP Title 
The final type of the private-party disputes originated in claims of 
competing ownership of an intellectual property right. Without a doubt, the 
most prominent example is the case of Anheuser-Busch, which, to date, is 
also the sole intellectual property dispute that has made it to the ECtHR’s 
highest body, the Grand Chamber.127 
The applicant, an American company selling beer in the United 
States under the brand name “Budweiser,” decided to enter European 
markets and sell beer under the same trademark. In 1981, it applied for a 
trademark registration for “Budweiser” in Portugal.128 A Czech company, 
Budějovický Budvar, which also produced beer under the name 
“Budweiser,” opposed the application.129 It argued that “Budweiser Bier” 
had already been registered in its name as an appellation of origin under the 
1958 Lisbon Agreement.130 Following the breakdown of negotiations that 
                                                           
127 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. For a discussion of this case, see Klaus Dieter Beiter, 
The Right to Property and the Protection of Interests in Intellectual Property—A Human 
Rights Perspective on the European Court of Human Rights’ Decision in Anheuser-Bush 
Inc. v. Portugal, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 714 (2008); Burkhart 
Goebel, Trade Marks are “Possessions,” as are Applications, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 
197 (2007); Jennifer W. Reiss, Commercializing Human Rights: Trademarks in Europe 
After Anheuser-Bush v. Portugal, 14 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 176 (2011); Dragos, supra 
note 16, at 101–02, 106; Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?, supra note 16, at 3–4, 12–
13, 18–28, 30–32; Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Marks and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ENHANCED EDITION OF COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
335, 346–47 (Paul L. C. Torremans ed., 2008); Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 701–07. 
128 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 16. 
129 The term “Budweiser” came from Budweis, a German name for the town of České 
Budějovice in Bohemia, in the Czech Republic, where Budějovický Budvar produced its 
beer. 
130 The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their 
International Registration was signed in Lisbon on October 31, 1958, revised in Stockholm 
on July 14, 1967, and amended on September 28, 1979. The Lisbon Agreement enables 
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took place throughout the 1980s between the two companies, they moved 
to the courts. In 1995, the applicant company succeeded in claiming that 
the product to which the Czech company’s registration referred was not an 
appellation of origin, and that its registration should, accordingly, be 
cancelled.131 The applicant then obtained a registration certificate for the 
“Budweiser” trademark.132  
Budějovický Budvar appealed the issuance of the certificate, 
invoking a 1986 Bilateral Agreement between Portugal and Czechoslovakia 
on the reciprocal protection of appellations of origin.133 The trial court 
dismissed the appeal, finding that the only intellectual property eligible for 
protection under Portuguese law and the Bilateral Agreement was the 
“Českobudějovický Budvar” appellation of origin, and not the German 
translation of this phrase into “Budweiser Bier.”134  
This decision was, however, overturned by the appellate court in a 
judgment subsequently affirmed by the Portuguese Supreme Court, which 
held that the protection under the 1986 Agreement between the two states 
extended to cover translations of names of their respective national 
products. The applicant company’s registration of “Budweiser” as a 
trademark was, therefore, refused.135 In a last bid to defend its interests, the 
American company appealed to the ECtHR, claiming that the Portuguese 
Supreme Court’s application of a bilateral treaty that came into force after 
it had filed its application to register the trademark and ultimately caused 
the application’s rejection, disproportionately interfered with its right to the 
protection of intellectual property, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
to the ECHR. 
 The case was first considered by the Strasbourg Court’s Chamber, 
which, in a judgment of October 11, 2005, held that there had been no 
violation of the applicant company’s (intellectual) property rights.136 This was 
because the company had failed to obtain a final registration of its trademark 
                                                           
Contracting States to request other Contracting States to protect appellations of origin of 
certain products, if the appellations were recognized and protected as such in the country of 
origin and registered at the International Bureau of the WIPO. Both Portugal and the Czech 
Republic, as a successor to Czechoslovakia, were parties to this Agreement. 
131 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 18. 
132 Id. para. 19. 
133 This was the agreement between the governments of the Portuguese Republic and the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, on the Protection of Indications of Source, Appellations of 
Origin, and Other Geographical and Similar Designations, which was signed in Lisbon on 
January 10, 1986 and came into force on March 7, 1987, after publication in the Official 
Gazette. 
134 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901, para. 21. 
135 Id. para. 24. 
136 Id. para. 53. 
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(and not the application for the registration of a trademark), which could 
only be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of the ECHR.137 The 
Chamber clarified that the applicant company had had a hope for—but not 
a legally protected legitimate expectation of—acquiring such a 
“possession.”138 Accordingly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was held to be 
inapplicable to the mere applications for trademark registration.139 
Upon the applicant company’s request, the case was then referred 
to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber considered the bundle of 
financial rights and interests that derived from an application for trademark 
registration, which, notwithstanding its conditional character, provided a 
substantial financial value for the applicant company.140 The Grand 
Chamber, thus, noted that the applicant owned a set of proprietary rights 
recognized by domestic law in connection with its trademark application, 
which was to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.141  
Nonetheless, no violation of that provision was recognized by the 
Grand Chamber.142 As to the issue of the alleged retrospective application 
of the 1986 Agreement, it noted that the applicant company did not have 
an effective registration in existence when the impugned legislation took 
effect.143 Concerning the applicant company’s allegation of violation of the 
right of priority of its trademark application, the ECtHR reiterated that its 
role was not to review domestic courts’ interpretation of relevant 
legislation.144 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Portuguese Supreme 
Court’s judgment did not interfere with the applicant company’s right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of its possessions.145 
*** 
One important conclusion arising from an overview of Convention 
cases on IP disputes between private parties is that many essentially private 
disputes can still be attributed to the state. An exception is the case of 
Mihăilescu v. Romania146 discussed above. However, for the horizontal 
effect of the Convention to come into play, courts hearing such disputes 
must do more than “provide[] a forum for the determination of the 
applicant’s rights.”147 There must also be a reasonable suspicion of 
                                                           
137 Id. paras. 50–52. 
138 Id. para. 52. 
139 Id. para. 53. 
140 Id. para. 76. 
141 Id. para. 78. 
142 Id. para. 87. 
143 Id. para. 84. 
144 Id. para. 85. 
145 Id. para. 87. 
146 ECtHR, Mihăilescu v. Romania (dec.) no. 47748/99, Aug. 26, 2003, 
CE:ECHR:2003:0826DEC004774899. 
147 ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 3. 
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arbitrariness or unfairness on the part of the domestic judiciary or a lack of 
proportionality in the domestic judiciary’s approach towards balancing the 
applicant’s interests. If the domestic courts interpret national law in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the Convention’s requirements—including, 
by application of legislation which contradicts the guarantees of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1—the horizontal effect of the ECHR arises. This is a positive 
phenomenon, as it extends the safeguards of human rights review to the 
private-party level. 
In general, the principles on which the Strasbourg Court decides 
private IP disputes are hardly different from those that have already been 
outlined above in relation to claims originating from a direct state action. 
The claimed IP entitlement must find some recognition at the national level 
for the issue to arise under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. Once 
such recognition is established, the questions of whether there was an 
interference with the applicant’s possessions and whether it was in 
accordance with law, served a legitimate aim, and was proportionate to that 
aim will be left to the wide discretion of the Member States to the ECHR.  
As discussed above, the first criterion (recognition of the property 
right by the domestic legal system) was not met in Rapos v. Slovakia, where 
the claims in a design dispute that was not determined by a final court 
decision could not qualify as a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.148 In cases where the applicants’ property 
claim fell within the scope of Article 1 of the First Protocol, no violation was 
recognized either due to the applicants’ failure to properly substantiate their 
claims (G.D. & M. v. Germany149 and Melnychuk v. Ukraine150) or due to 
the wide discretion accorded to domestic courts in balancing the applicants’ 
intellectual property rights with other competing interests (Aral,151 Paeffgen 
Gmbh,152 and Anheuser-Busch153). Notably, most such cases were rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, were not even adjudicated on the 
merits.154 
                                                           
148 ECtHR, Rapos v. Slovakia, no. 25763/02, May 20, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302, para. 40. 
149 G.D. & M. v. Germany, App. No. 29818/96 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 20, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4256. 
150 ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine, no. 28743/03, July 5, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303, para. 1. 
151 Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4064. 
152 ECtHR, Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.), nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 
21770/05, Sept. 18, 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904, para. 1. 
153 ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, Jan. 11, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. 
154 Of all the cases reviewed in this section (Section II.B), only Anheuser-Busch was decided 
on the merits. All other cases were rejected at the level of admissibility review—the majority 
of cases were manifestly ill-founded for either lack of interference with the applicant’s right 
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C. Claims Against International Organizations (EPO) 
Alongside Article 1 Protocol No. 1 cases on IP resulting out of 
direct state action and those originating from private-party litigation, a 
separate category of applications arose out of complaints against 
international organizations, notably, the European Patent Office (EPO). In 
a number of referrals to the ECtHR, the applicants claimed that structural 
deficiencies of EPO proceedings resulted in the loss of their patent rights—
mainly through revocation—by the Contracting States to the European 
Patent Convention, all of which were also parties to the ECHR.155 The 
Commission and the Strasbourg Court have, however, steadily rejected such 
allegations, holding that they were not competent to examine complaints 
against international organizations that were not parties to the ECHR in their 
own right. The ECHR courts acknowledged that the transfer of powers from 
an ECHR State to an international organization (such as the EPO) did not 
altogether exclude that State’s responsibility under the ECHR, making the 
State’s responsibility dependent on the level of fundamental rights 
protection provided by that organization. Given that the European Patent 
Convention provided, according to the Commission and the Strasbourg 
Court, “equivalent protection” as the ECHR,156 any transfer of powers to the 
EPO was compatible with the ECHR. 
The ensuing lack of human rights (or other judicial control) over 
the EPO was critically assessed by some commentators who expressed 
concerns that, while “the national patent laws of European’s [sic] various 
nations must all operate in accordance with principles of human rights[,] . . 
. no such check is placed upon the operations of the European Patent Office 
itself.”157 In the latest of the ECtHR decisions on the EPO, however, the 
                                                           
or for no appearance of arbitrariness or unfairness on the part of domestic courts involved 
in the proportionality analysis. Most of the cases discussed in Section II.A (on state direct 
action) were similarly rejected at the admissibility stage, with only Bălan and SIA 
AKKA/LAA reaching examination on the merits. 
155 Heinz v. Contracting States Party to the European Patent Convention Insofar as They Are 
High Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, App. No. 
21090/92 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 10, 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2593; 
Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2868; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4410; Lenzing 
AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4408; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no. 
40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204. 
156 On the observance of human rights in the EPO’s practice, see Agnieszka Kupzok, Human 
Rights in the Case Law of the EPO Boards of Appeal, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 311. 
157 Jeremy Phillips, EPO Not Bound by Human Rights Convention, IPKAT (Nov. 23, 2004), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2004/11/epo-not-bound-by-human-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/37CD-HXFV]. More generally, for a criticism of the lack of judicial review 
33
Geiger and Izyumenko: Shaping Intellectual Property Rights Through Human Rights Adjudic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
560 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
ECtHR emphasized that the presumption of “equivalent protection” can be 
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is found that the 
protection of Convention rights is manifestly deficient.158 
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION AS A 
COUNTERWEIGHT TO IP PROTECTION (BUT ALSO AS GROUNDS FOR 
IT?) 
In addition to the right to property protection for intellectual 
property, the ECHR safeguards a series of other fundamental rights of 
relevance for IP, which have equal—if not higher—value159 and against which 
IP rights must be balanced. The first of these rights is, without doubt, the 
right to freedom of expression and information guaranteed under Article 
10 of the ECHR and is sometimes called the European First Amendment.160 
Claims of users form the vast majority of disputes brought to the Convention 
organs under this right. On a few occasions, however, Article 10 of the 
ECHR was invoked by the rightsholders themselves either as grounds for 
                                                           
of EPO decisions, see Jochen Pagenberg, The ECJ on the Draft Agreement for a European 
and Community Patent Court—Hearing of May 18, 2010, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 695, 700–05 (2010). 
158 ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009, 
CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204, para. 1. 
159 On the hierarchy of the ECHR rights, see Peggy Ducoulombier, Interaction Between 
Human Rights: Are All Human Rights Equal?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 39, 45–46, observing in particular 
that the “strength” of ECHR rights can be determined based on the scope of the margin of 
appreciation allocated to states in relation to each such right and noting that, following this 
logic, the ECHR’s property provision, “in respect of which the margin usually deploys its full 
effect,” is inferior to, among others, the right to freedom of expression and the right to the 
protection of private life “for which the margin plays an important albeit variable role.” The 
freedom of expression specifically, indeed, benefits from a privileged position in the 
European constitutional order, constituting, according to the Strasbourg Court, “one of the 
essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for the development of every man.” ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom, no. 
5493/72, Dec. 7, 1976, CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, para. 49. 
160 Dirk Voorhoof, Het Europese “First Amendment”: de vrijheid van expressie en informatie 
en de rechtspraak van het EHRM betreffende art. 10 EVRM (1994-1995), 1995 
MEDIAFORUM (Amsterdam) 11; CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU 
PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE 166 (2004). 
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stronger protection of their essentially economic interests161 or to justify the 
right to express oneself via trademark registration.162  
The only two areas of IP law which have, so far, given rise to 
proceedings under the ECHR’s right to freedom of expression are copyright 
(Section III.A) and trademarks (Section III.B), although a claim on a 
potential violation of freedom of expression and information in the field of 
trade secrets is currently (as of March 2020) pending before the Strasbourg 
Court.163 
A. The Impact of the Convention’s Right to Freedom of Expression on 
Copyright Law 
The oldest type of conflict between IP and human rights faced by 
the ECtHR concerns copyright and freedom of expression.164 Already in 
                                                           
161 See the AEPI case discussed infra Section III.A.3. There is also the idea that, insofar as 
copyright is “the engine of free expression,” freedom of expression could support, in theory, 
a protection claim. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). However, it is likely that 
the “engine” argument is more suitable as a justification for the protection of the rights of 
users than those of copyright holders, as this argument explains the rationale for (or goal of) 
the grant of protection. It does not address the nature of the right at stake. Thus, property 
protection for IP may well be argued to ultimately advance freedom of expression interests. 
This is, essentially, what stands behind the utilitarian theories on the justification of copyright 
protection. It is in this spirit, for instance, that the protection of arts and sciences is 
understood in the U.S. Constitution as the purpose behind the grant of economic (most 
frequently property) rights to the holders of copyrights and patents. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. 
162 See the cases discussed infra Section III.B.2. 
163 ECtHR, Diasamidze v. Georgia, nos. 49071/12, 51940/12, communicated on September 
14, 2016. 
164 For a comparative analysis of the approaches taken by the ECtHR and another 
supranational court in Europe—the CJEU—towards resolving the conflicts between copyright 
and freedom of expression, see Elena Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of 
Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective, 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 115 
(2016); Alain Strowel, Pondération entre liberté d’expression et droit d’auteur sur Internet: 
de la réserve des juges de Strasbourg à une concordance pratique par les juges de 
Luxembourg, 100 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 889 (2014). Most 
recently, the CJEU faced the conflict of copyright and freedom of expression in three 
decisions in the intersection of copyright, freedom of artistic expression, and freedom of the 
press. See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=216545&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=20368
6; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1950544; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck 
(July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1951971.  
For commentary on these important decisions, see Geiger & Izyumenko, supra 
note 6; Caterina Sganga, A Decade of Fair Balance Doctrine, and How to Fix It: Copyright 
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1968, some ten years after the Convention’s enforcement mechanism—the 
ECtHR—was incepted, the Convention institutions had to decide on the 
compatibility of copyright protection for compilations of television 
programs with Article 10 of the Convention.165 Over the years, the conflict 
has developed from being more or less ignored by the Convention 
institutions (Section III.A.1) to becoming fully acknowledged in the wake of 
the expansion of copyright protection and its enforcement mechanisms in 
the digital environment (Section III.A.2). Furthermore, as already 
mentioned, Article 10 was scrutinized for not only its potential to further 
widen public access to protected works, but also from the standpoint of its 
capacity to provide an even stronger protection to the exclusive rights of IP 
holders (Section III.A.3). 
1. Emergence of A Conflict: Copyright’s Monopoly on Information 
and the Freedom of Expression of “Infringers” 
The first Convention case on copyright and freedom of expression 
(and on the conflict of IP and human rights in general), N.V. Televizier v. 
Netherlands,166 arose out of a complaint filed by Televizier, the Dutch 
                                                           
Versus Fundamental Rights Before the CJEU From Promusicae to Funke Medien, Pelham 
and Spiegel Online, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683 (2019); Thom Snijders & Stijn van 
Deursen, The Road Not Taken—the CJEU Sheds Light on the Role of Fundamental Rights 
in the European Copyright Framework—A Case Note on the Pelham, Spiegel Online and 
Funke Medien Decisions, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1176 (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-019-00883-0 [https://perma.cc/B8PW-KAUT]; Bernd 
Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Sample, Sample in My Song, Can They Tell Where You 
Are From? The Pelham Judgment—Part I, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Nov. 6, 2019), 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/11/06/sample-sample-in-my-song-can-they-tell-
where-you-are-from-the-pelham-judgment-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/H2PJ-VBXJ]; Bernd 
Justin Jütte, CJEU Permits Sampling of Phonograms Under a de Minimis Rule and the 
Quotation Exception, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 827 (2019); see also Christophe Geiger 
& Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in 
the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
131 (2019); Jonathan Griffiths, European Union Copyright Law and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights—Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinions in (C-469/17) Funke Medien, 
(C-476/17) Pelham GmbH and (C-516/17) Spiegel Online, 20 ERA FORUM 35 (2019); 
Daniël Jongsma, AG Szpunar on Copyright’s Relation to Fundamental Rights: One Step 
Forward and Two Steps Back?, 2019 IPRINFO 1 (2019); Bernd Justin Jütte & João Pedro 
Quintais, Advocate General Turns Down the Music—Sampling is Not a Fundamental Right 
Under EU Copyright Law, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 654 (2019). 
165 See N.V. Televizier v. Netherlands, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
782 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-73428 (discussed infra 
text accompanying notes 166–173). The ECtHR was established on January 21, 1959, when 
the first members of the court were elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COURT IN BRIEF, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAX4-UENR] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
166 N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 782. For more on this 
case, see Harvard Law Review Ass’n, International Law—European Convention on Human 
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publisher of a weekly magazine which contained details on forthcoming 
radio and television programs of the country’s five broadcasting 
corporations. In response to Televizier’s publications of these programs, 
those broadcasters and an organization which periodically made 
compilations of their programs called Centraal Bureau voor den Omroep 
in Nederland (Dutch Central Broadcasting Office) instituted civil 
proceedings against Televizier.  
In those proceedings, it was alleged that the applicant, when 
publishing information about forthcoming radio and television programs, 
had made use of the compilations of the Broadcasting Office in violation of 
the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912.167 Pursuant to section 10 of that Act, 
copyright protection extended even to works that were not of a distinctive 
or personal character.168 After a series of court decisions, the Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands eventually affirmed the Broadcasting Office’s (but not 
the corporations’) copyright in the compilations by finding that copyright in 
a text lacking personal character could be violated not only by a literal 
reproduction of the text but also by its reproduction in a revised form.169 
Televizier contested this finding before the European Commission 
of Human Rights, maintaining that, as a consequence of the Dutch Supreme 
Court’s decision, broadcasting corporations that also published weekly 
magazines or had financial interest in such magazines had an unjustifiable 
monopoly over the news services on forthcoming radio and television 
programs in the Netherlands.170 This amounted, in the applicant company’s 
opinion, to a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
Convention.171 
The European Commission of Human Rights declared the 
application admissible as it gave rise to a number of important issues 
regarding the interpretation of the Convention and held that the applicant 
company was a “victim” within the meaning of the Convention.172 However, 
the court never reached the merits of the case because an out-of-court 
settlement was reached between the parties.173 Televizier was absorbed into 
one of the five broadcasting corporations and was thereafter allowed to 
publish the complete programs of all broadcasting organizations.  
                                                           
Rights—Commission Decides to Consider Dutch Copyright Decision Challenged on 
Freedom of Expression Grounds, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1798 (1967); Melville Nimmer, Does 
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA 
L. REV. 1180, 1185 (1970). 
167 N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 784. 
168 The Dutch Copyright Act (Vevam) (2015), https://www.vevam.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Dutch-Copyright-Act-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMZ8-6ZYT]. 
169 HR 25 juni 1965, NJ 1966, 116 (Televizier/Netherlands) (Neth.).  
170 N.V. Televizier, App. No. 2690/65, 1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 785. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 786. 
173 Id. at 787. 
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Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the Dutch Copyright Act of 
1912, on which the proceedings against the applicant company were based, 
were replaced by new legislation—namely, the new Broadcasting Act of 1967 
and the Royal Decree of 1969. The Broadcasting Act of 1967, in particular, 
envisaged that the newly created coordinating broadcasting authority—
Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting, 
NOS)—was to compile the complete program listings on information 
supplied by various licensed broadcasting organizations. It then had to make 
available those listings to all broadcasting organizations for reproduction and 
publication in their own program magazines. In addition, short summaries 
of the lists were to be sent to daily newspapers, those appearing at least three 
times a week, and certain foreign publishers. Pursuant to Article 22 of the 
Broadcasting Act of 1967, any other reproduction or publication of these 
lists without the consent of the broadcasting authority constituted an 
infringement of copyright and entailed civil liability. 
Thus, the new legislative arrangement did not completely solve the 
problem from which the Televizier application to the EСtHR arose. This 
subsequently resulted in a challenge of the new legislation and the Dutch 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 1912 Copyright Act in Televizier by 
another company on analogous grounds. This time, the challenge involved 
the publisher of weekly “general interest” magazines in the Netherlands—
De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. (D.G.P.N.V.)—whose petition for distributing 
complete lists of television and radio program data was refused because of 
the Broadcasting Act of 1967 and the Royal Decree of 1969.174 The Royal 
Decree of 1969, in particular, distinguished between publishers of daily and 
three-times-weekly papers and weekly “general interest” magazines, such 
that the former were permitted to publish a summary of program data 
whereas the latter were not. The applicant company brought its case before 
the European Commission of Human Rights complaining that such a 
refusal constituted an unjustified interference with its right to freely receive 
and impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR.175 
                                                           
174 D.G.P.N.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13 
(1976). On this case, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, 
at 261–63, 273, 277–79; and Christoph Beat Graber, Copyright and Access—A Human 
Rights Perspective, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: THE END OF COLLECTING 
SOCIETIES? 71, 85 (Christoph Beat Graber et al. eds., 2005). 
175 On the conflict between copyright and freedom of information as protected by Article 10 
of the ECHR, see generally GEIGER, supra note 160; Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, 
Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in 5 NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007); Hugenholtz, supra note 
16; Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil 
Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, and Access, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 287 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2006); 
Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era, supra 
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Even though the European Commission of Human Rights declared 
the application admissible as “rais[ing] substantial issues of law and of 
fact,”176 it nevertheless found no violation of the Convention. It first 
considered that the freedom to impart information of the kind at issue could 
only be granted to “the author, the originator or otherwise the intellectual 
owner.”177 As a result, there had been no interference with the applicant 
company’s rights since it had been prevented from publishing the 
information which it did not yet possess.178 The Commission further noted 
that the free flow of such information had not been jeopardized in any way 
since the general public could inform itself about the program schedule 
through a variety of other sources.179 Finally, the Commission held that the 
mere commercial interest of the applicant company, which might have been 
compromised by its competitive disadvantage to other magazines, did not 
fall within the scope of Article 10 of the ECHR.180 
As Professor Hugenholtz observed in his seminal work on 
“Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe,” the “Commission’s 
conclusion that third parties may never invoke Article 10 freedoms with 
respect to ‘single-source’ data is obviously erroneous,” as “[f]reedom of 
expression under Article 10 is not confined to speech that is original with 
the speaker.”181 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s pronouncement on the conflict of 
copyright with freedom of information in De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. 
remained the sole authority on the subject for around twenty years. It was 
not until the end of the 1990s when the conflict was brought up again, this 
time in the context of a claim by the French public national television 
channel, France 2.182  
                                                           
note 164. For further references to numerous sources exploring the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression, see Yin Harn Lee, Copyright and Freedom of 
Expression: A Literature Review (CREATe Working Paper No. 2015/04, 2015), 
https://zenodo.org/record/18132/files/CREATe-Working-Paper-2015-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5J6-Q5KQ]. 
176 D.G.P.N.V., App. No. 5178/71, 44 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13, 24. 
177 De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, para. 84 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. July 6, 1976), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22appno%22:[%225178/71%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-95643%22]}. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. para. 86. 
180 Id. paras. 87–88. 
181 Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12. 
182 Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-28411. On this case, see Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 12–13; Strowel & 
Tulkens, supra note 175, at 306–07; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 263–64; Geiger & 
Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16, at 332–33; Graber, supra 
note 174, at 85–86. 
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In November 1988, as part of a theatrical news television program 
devoted to a famous actress, France 2 broadcasted an information report on 
the restoration of a theatre on the Champs-Elysées. In that report, the 
camera filmed for a few moments (forty-nine seconds) the wall frescoes by 
the painter Edouard Vuillard. On those grounds, the painter’s assigns filed, 
via the copyright collecting society SPADEM (Société de la Propriété 
Artistique et des Dessins et Modèles), a claim for damages for the broadcast 
of works without payment of royalties. 
The High Court of Paris first found against the painter’s estate183 on 
the grounds that the presentation of the paintings amounted to a “brief 
quotation”184 justified by the critical or informatory nature of the television 
report in which they were incorporated. This judgment was, however, 
overturned on appeal,185 and France 2 was ordered to pay 12,000 francs in 
damages. According to the appellate court, since some of the painter’s 
frescoes were shown in their entirety, their representation could not amount 
to a “brief quotation.” Finding that the frescoes were not part of the decor 
of the theatre whose restoration was the topic of the broadcast, the appellate 
court held that the communication of the frescoes of Vuillard to the public 
was not justified on this occasion by the informational character of the work 
in which their representation was incorporated. The applicant’s subsequent 
appeal to the French Supreme Court was equally unsuccessful.186 The 
supreme court found that the integral representation of a work, whatever its 
form and duration, could not be regarded as a brief quotation within the 
meaning of the French Intellectual Property Code. France 2 then appealed 
to the European Commission of Human Rights, arguing that the supreme 
court’s decision, which precluded the television channel from exercising the 
right of quotation in artistic matters, violated its right to freedom of 
expression.  
The Commission first noted that “the facts complained of by the 
applicant constitute[d] an interference with the applicant’s right to freely 
communicate information.”187 It then established, without difficulty, that the 
                                                           
183 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 5, 
1991 (Fr.). 
184 Within the meaning of an internal exception to copyright envisaged in Article 41(3) of the 
French Law on Literary and Artistic Property of March 11, 1957, which was, since July 1, 
1992, incorporated in Article L. 122-5(3)(a) of the French Intellectual Property Code of July 
1, 1992, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=322949 [https://perma.cc/ZK3X-
H5SG] (available only in French). 
185 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, July 7, 1992 (Fr.). 
186 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 4, 1995, Bull. 
Civ. I, no. 296 (Fr.). 
187 Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French and translation by authors), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411. 
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interference was prescribed by law—namely, the national copyright law 
provisions on the rights of exploitation—and that the text of those provisions 
was “adequately accessible” and easily foreseeable by the applicant, “a 
television channel, whose activity is directly related to the legislation on 
intellectual property.”188 As to the purpose of interference, the Commission 
considered that it was “intended to protect the rights of others, in particular 
the rights of authors of literary and artistic works.”189 The core of the analysis 
then centered, as is often the case, on the question of proportionality. In this 
regard, the European Commission pointed out that: 
[I]t is not required to decide whether the decision was consistent 
with domestic law, but to consider it with reference to Article 10 
. . . of the Convention. The Commission is not therefore required 
to decide on the interpretation of the notion of ‘brief quotation’. 
It also recalls that it is normally not for the Convention organs to 
resolve, under paragraph 2 of Article 10 . . ., the conflicts which 
may arise between, on the one hand, the right to freely 
communicate information and, on the other hand, the right of 
authors whose works are communicated. The Commission must 
assess whether there is a proportional link between the limitation 
to the above-mentioned freedom of the applicant and the 
interests protected by this limitation. 
The Commission notes that the applicant was ordered to pay 
damages because of the absence of the payment of royalties due 
to the author of the frescoes, which have been fully disseminated. 
Given the circumstances of the case, the Commission considers 
that it was reasonable for the relevant domestic courts, in the 
interest of the author and his assigns, to take account of the rights 
of these latter over the works, which have been after all freely 
disseminated by the applicant. Consequently, the Commission 
considers that the restriction or penalty at issue constituted a 
measure necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of 
others.190 
Like the De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V. ruling, the Commission’s 
reasoning in France 2 has been criticized in the literature, this time for the 
Commission’s excessive cautiousness in intervening in the area of copyright 
from an external freedom of expression perspective.191 However, when 
compared to the first two decisions on copyright and freedom of expression 
involving broadcasting organizations’ monopoly in television listings, the 
analysis in France 2 might appear as a step forward. This is because in 




191 Hugenholtz, supra note 16, at 13; Graber, supra note 174, at 86. 
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France 2, the Commission admitted that copyright regulation constitutes an 
“interference” with the right to freedom of expression and information and 
hence is not immune, as it is often argued, from an external human rights 
review.192 A real breakthrough in the court’s treatment of the free expression 
and copyright conflict, however, did not occur until recently when the 
ECtHR faced the problems posed by the enforcement of copyright on the 
free flow of information in the new digital environment. 
2. Further Development of the “Infringers” Argument in the Digital 
Environment: File-Sharing on the Internet and Website 
Blocking 
As mentioned above, the latest developments in the Convention’s 
copyright and freedom of expression case law all concern, unsurprisingly, 
the measures of copyright enforcement online.193 In the past few years, the 
court has addressed the questions of potentially excessive copyright 
enforcement techniques and their effects on the Convention right to 
freedom of expression and information on three occasions. 
The first two cases, decided almost simultaneously in early 2013, 
pertained to the issues of unauthorized dissemination of copyright-
protected works on the internet. One of the cases, Donald v. France,194 
                                                           
192 In fact, for a long time, courts in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have been very 
reluctant to admit any freedom of expression defense in copyright law, considering that any 
potential conflict has already been internally addressed by legislatures through the legal 
boundaries of the exclusive right. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (finding no need to expand the fair use doctrine “[i]n view of the 
First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use”); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 
375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]opyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First 
Amendment.”); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally 
recognized rights in intellectual property.”); Television New Zealand Ltd. v. Newsmonitor 
Servs. Ltd. [1994] 2 NZLR 91 (N.Z.); Cour de cassation [Cass] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 1e civ., July 4, 1995, 167 RIDA 259 (Fr.); CB-Infobank I, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 16, 1997, GRUR 459 (1997) (Ger.); Karikaturwiedergabe, 
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 9, 1997, GRUR INT. 896 (1998) 
(Austria). 
193 See Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era, 
supra note 164 (analyzing the influence of the right to freedom of expression and information 
on European copyright law in the digital context). 
194 ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French). For an assessment of this 
case, see Geiger & Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16; Dirk 
Voorhoof & Inger Høedt-Rasmussen, ECHR: Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression, 
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/
2013/01/25/echr-copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression/ [https://perma.cc/47TP-48QL]; Paul 
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concerned a conviction for copyright infringement in France by three 
fashion photographers, one of whom had taken photographs of Paris 
fashion shows and posted them on a website of the applicants’ online 
fashion magazine. Since the pictures were published without authorization 
from the fashion houses concerned, the fashion houses, together with the 
French Fashion Federation, filed a suit for copyright infringement. The 
three photographers based their defense on Article 10 of the ECHR and 
Article L. 122-5 9° of the French Intellectual Property Code (an internal 
copyright exception allowing the reproduction of artistic works for news 
reporting). The photographers, however, ultimately lost in national 
proceedings, as the national courts considered Article L. 122-5 9° 
inapplicable to the creations of designers and fashion houses, even though 
the latter were also protected under French copyright law. As a result, the 
photographers were ordered to pay fines and damages totaling more than 
250,000 euros. 
In the wake of that national court’s decision, the photographers 
applied to the Strasbourg Court, insisting that the fashion photographs 
contained information of general public interest and that their posting on a 
website, even for sale, amounted to a proportionate exercise of freedom of 
expression. 
A similar issue of conflicting copyright and freedom of expression 
rights arose almost simultaneously before the ECtHR in another high-
profile dispute by two co-founders of the notorious “The Pirate Bay” (TPB) 
file-sharing service. The co-founders were criminally charged in Sweden for 
contributing, through their service, to the infringement of copyrights on 
music, films, and computer games.195 As in the case with the French 
photographers, the national proceedings ended unfavorably for the TPB co-
founders, who received prison sentences of ten and eight months 
respectively, together with joint liability for damages amounting to 
                                                           
L.C. Torremans, Ashby Donald and Others v. France, Application 36769/08, ECtHR, 5th 
section, Judgment of 10 January 2013, 4 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 95 (2014); Strowel, 
supra note 164; Fabien Marchadier, Le conflit entre le droit d’auteur et la liberté 
d’expression devant la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, 304 LÉGIPRESSE 221 
(2013); Alain Zollinger, Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression: le discours de la méthode 
(Commentaire CEDH, 10 janv. 2013, n° 36769/08, Ashby Donald et a. c/ France), 5 PROP. 
INTELL. 7 (2013). 
195 ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. For comments on this case, see Geiger & 
Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16; Dirk Voorhoof & Inger 
Høedt-Rasmussen, ECHR: Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression II (The Pirate Bay), 
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/
2013/03/20/echr-copyright-vs-freedom-of-expression-ii-the-pirate-bay/ [https://perma.cc/
47TP-48QL]; J. Jones, Internet Pirates Walk the Plank with Article 10 Kept at Bay: Neij and 
Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, 35(11) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 695 (2013); Strowel, supra 
note 164. 
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approximately five million euros. According to the Swedish courts, TPB 
had furthered illegal file-sharing in such a way that the persons responsible 
for the website became criminally liable.196 
Like the applicants in Ashby Donald, the TPB co-founders sought 
justice in the ECtHR. They maintained that Article 10 of the ECHR 
enshrined the right to offer an automatic service of transferring unprotected 
material between users—in line with the basic principles of freedom of 
communication on the internet—and convicting persons responsible for that 
service for the acts committed by its users ran afoul of those principles. 
In each case, the ECtHR held that the applicants’ convictions 
constituted an interference with Article 10 of the ECHR. Although the court 
ultimately found no violation of that provision, it engaged in an elaborate 
analysis of the proportionality of interference with the aim of copyright 
protection, thereby departing from its previous reluctance expressed in 
France 2 to resolve “the conflicts which may arise between, on the one hand, 
the right to freely communicate information and, on the other hand, the 
right of authors whose works are communicated.”197  
According to the ECtHR, the factors that stood against the 
applicants were the commercial character of their expression198 and the fact 
that the information contained in the shared material did not contribute—
unlike what the applicants in Donald had claimed—to the general debate of 
public interest199 and, therefore, “[could not] reach the same level [of 
protection] as that afforded to political expression and debate.”200 
Furthermore, restrictions on Article 10 were all the more justified by the 
fact that the proprietary interests of copyright holders were equally protected 
by the Convention by virtue of the applicability to intellectual property of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (protection of property).201 The 
                                                           
196 Notably, the court of appeals pointed out that the TPB had created the possibility of 
uploading and storing Torrent files, which is a database and a tracker-function, and thus had 
not merely offered data transfers or caching. The court of appeals also noted that the 
defendants had committed intentional offenses and had not taken any precautionary 
measures, and the torrent files, which referred to copyright-protected material, had not been 
removed despite warnings and requests for removal. 
197 See Société Nationale de Programmes FRANCE 2 v. France, App. No. 30262/96 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 15, 1997) (available only in French and translation by authors), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-28411. 
198 Compare ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 39 (available only in French), with ECtHR, 
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. 
199 ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 39 (available only in French). 
200 ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. 
201 See supra Part II. 
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court also emphasized the “nature and severity of the penalties imposed”202 
on the applicants but held that, in neither case, could those penalties be 
regarded as disproportionate.203 
The court’s analysis in Donald and The Pirate Bay denoted a 
prominent and important shift. Through these cases, the ECtHR made it 
clear that even illegal and profit-making sharing of copyright-protected 
material was not devoid of freedom of expression guarantees, and, in certain 
circumstances, it was simply impossible to ignore the freedom of expression 
checks to assess the impact of the copyright framework on the enjoyment of 
human rights in Europe.204 The eagerness of the court to give more scrutiny 
from external human rights perspective to internal copyright regulation was 
demonstrated again in another Article 10 decision, rendered one year after 
the cases discussed above. Akdeniz v. Turkey205 concerned blocking access 
to the websites myspace.com and last.fm in Turkey, at the request of the 
Professional Union of Phonogram Producers, on the grounds that the 
websites were disseminating musical works in violation of copyright. The 
applicant—who had applied to the ECtHR as a regular user of the websites 
in question—complained about the collateral effects of blocking and argued 
that it amounted to a disproportionate response in light of Article 10 of the 
ECHR.  
Like in Donald and The Pirate Bay, the ECtHR engaged in the 
proportionality evaluation, providing certain guidance on how this type of 
conflict can be approached from the freedom of expression standpoint. 
Although the application was declared inadmissible for the applicant’s lack 
of victim status,206 the ECtHR implied that the outcome might have been 
                                                           
202 ECtHR, Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (The Pirate Bay) (dec.), no. 40397/12, Feb. 19, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. 
203 In The Pirate Bay case, the court took into consideration that “the domestic courts found 
that the applicants had not taken any action to remove the torrent files in question, despite 
having been urged to do so. Instead they had been indifferent to the fact that copyright-
protected works had been the subject of file-sharing activities via TPB.” Id. In regards to the 
French photographers in Donald, the court reasoned, rather surprisingly, that the applicants 
“ha[d] not produced any evidence” to prove that the substantial criminal fines imposed on 
them had “financially strangled” them. ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 
2013, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 43 (available only in French and 
translated in 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 354 (2014)). 
204 For a joint analysis of the Donald and The Pirate Bay rulings, see Geiger & Izyumenko, 
Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial, supra note 16. 
205 ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20877/10, Mar. 11, 2014, 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710 (available only in French). On this case, see 
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright 
Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 43 (2016); Strowel, supra note 164, at 890–95, 909. 
206 ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20877/10, Mar. 11, 2014, 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, para. 29 (available only in French). 
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different depending on how the website was used (actively or passively),207 
the collateral effects of blocking on legitimate content,208 the value of the 
blocked information in terms of its contribution to matters of general 
interest,209 the availability of alternative means of accessing that 
information,210 and the comparative importance of IP as a human right 
against which the rights of internet users had to be balanced.211 
3. Freedom of Expression as a Restriction to Access: Article 10 
Invoked on the Part of the Rightsholders 
As stated in the introduction to this section, freedom of expression 
was not always invoked before the ECtHR as a justification for broader 
access to protected works. Quite to the contrary, on certain occasions, 
Article 10 was raised by rightsholders in an attempt to further strengthen 
and broaden protection. For example, in the case of AEPI S.A.,212 the lack 
of protection for all musical works administered by the Greek collecting 
society—AEPI (Hellenic Society for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property)—when it could not secure an approval from the Ministry of 
Culture was challenged by AEPI on freedom of expression grounds. AEPI 
complained that, while its request for approval was pending before the 
Ministry of Culture, it was unable to sue on behalf of its members and 
ensure that their works were not disseminated without royalty payments. 
AEPI maintained that artistic expression, including music, was an integral 
part of the rights protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, and this protection 
encompassed the right of the creator of a literary or artistic work to exercise 
“total control over such work, as desired.”213 According to the AEPI, it 
followed that “no one [could] break by whatever means the link between 
the creator and his work, for example, by disseminating the work without 
the rightsholder’s permission.”214 The ECtHR rejected this overbroad 
reading of Article 10, not because of the substance of the applicant 
organization’s complaint, but rather because the court did not consider the 
applicant—a legal entity—eligible to raise this sort of action. The court 
explained: 
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant, as a 
legal entity, does not purport to be itself a victim of a violation of 
the right guaranteed by Article 10, since the restrictions referred 
                                                           
207 Id. para. 27. 
208 Id. para. 28. 
209 Id. para. 26. 
210 Id. para. 25. 
211 Id. para. 28. 
212 ECtHR, AEPI S.A. v. Greece (dec.), no. 48679/99, May 3, 2001, 
CE:ECHR:2001:0503DEC004867999 (available only in French). 
213 Id. para. 3 (translated from French by the authors). 
214 Id. 
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by it—namely the dissemination of musical works without 
appropriate authorization—affected the artist members of the 
AEPI but not the AEPI itself. It also notes that Law no. 
2121/1993 [on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters] 
itself distinguishes between property rights (Article 3 of the Law) 
and moral rights (Article 4) of the creators of works of art. Articles 
54 and 55 of this Law entrust organisations such as the applicant 
the management of only the property rights of the artists, and not 
their moral rights, which are closely related to the creators’ 
personality. Moreover, Article 12 § 2 of Law no. 2121/1993 
provides that the moral right cannot be transferred. The applicant 
cannot, therefore, be considered a victim of a violation of Article 
10 in this case.215 
It is noteworthy, however, that the court did not exclude the possibility for 
the authors to raise the claim under Article 10 in order to restrict access to 
their works in circumstances analogous to those surrounding the claim by 
AEPI. 
B. Freedom of Expression in the Trademark Context 
In addition to copyright, another intellectual property right with 
which the right to freedom of expression comes into potential conflict is the 
right to the protection of trademarks. So far, the interplay of trademarks and 
free speech gave rise to two types of disputes before the Convention 
institutions: those pertaining to unauthorized use of trademarks by third 
parties for socially important purposes, including parodic criticism (Section 
III.B.1), and claims coming from potential trademark holders challenging 
the refusals of their applications for trademark registration (Section III.B.2). 
1. Unauthorized Trademark Use and Its Justifiability on the Basis of 
Free Expression 
The use of a trademark for parodic criticism was tested on freedom 
of speech grounds before the Convention organs only once. This was on 
application in the beginning of the 1990s to the European Commission by 
an Austrian anti-smoking association and its chairman.216 As part of an 
advertising campaign against smoking, the association sold pamphlets, 
                                                           
215 Id. 
216 Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":
["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}. On this case, see WOLFGANG SAKULIN, 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER 
EUROPEAN LAW 284–86 (2011). 
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posters, and stickers depicting the caricature of a skeleton riding a camel 
and holding a cigarette in front of the camel. Underneath this picture, the 
following slogan was written: “ONLY A CAMEL WALKS MILES FOR A 
CIGARETTE.”217 Subsequently, an international tobacco company filed a 
lawsuit against the applicants, demanding that they discontinue the use of 
the slogan and pay compensation. According to the company, the publicity 
distorted its advertising slogan, “I walk miles for a CAMEL,”218 in a satirical 
and ironic manner, which could be understood as a disparagement of the 
company’s products.  
After a series of lower court decisions, the Austrian Supreme Court 
held against the applicants, imposing a prohibition on using the slogan, the 
picture, and the words “KAMEL” or “CAMEL” in the applicants’ anti-
smoking publicity.219 In particular, the supreme court found that a 
considerable part of the general public would understand the applicants’ 
publicity to be a clear allusion to the plaintiff’s cigarettes as being especially 
strong and unhealthy, and the applicants had not been entitled to select the 
plaintiff’s trademark in order to criticize tobacco products in general. 
The applicants contested the impugned prohibition before the 
Commission of Human Rights, arguing that their rights under Article 10 of 
the ECHR had been violated. The Commission confirmed that the tobacco 
industry had to tolerate a public debate concerning the risks of smoking 
even if information about health risks was presented in an ironical or 
satirical manner.220 Nevertheless, it found no justification for applicant’s use 
of the plaintiff’s particular cigarette brand, agreeing with the domestic courts’ 
balancing of the plaintiff’s reputation, the applicants’ rights, and the public 
interest in the dissemination of the slogan and caricature in question.221 
According to the Commission, by using the CAMEL trademark, “the 
applicants had not merely informed the public about health risks of smoking 
in general, but presented their criticism in the form of a caricature with an 
ironical slogan distorting the plaintiff’s trademarks and its advertising 
                                                           
217 In German, the slogan read: NUR EIN KAMEL GEHT MEILENWEIT FÜR EINE 
ZIGARETTE. “In German language, ‘Kamel’ is a pejorative term for a person acting in a 
foolish or stupid manner.” Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, 
No. 17200/90 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{"fulltext":["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}. 
218 “Ich gehe meilenweit für eine CAMEL,” in German.  
219 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], Jan. 9, 1990, 4 Ob 168/89, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_19900109_OGH0002_0040OB00168_
8900000_000/JJT_19900109_OGH0002_0040OB00168_8900000_000.pdf (Austria). 
220 Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur. 




Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/3
2020] SHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 575 
 
 
slogans.”222 The Commission, therefore, concluded that “the Austrian court 
decisions, in particular the Supreme Court’s decision . . . , did not go beyond 
the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in assessing the 
proportionality of an interference with the freedom of expression in 
accordance with Article 10 . . . of the Convention.”223 
About fifteen years later, the French Supreme Court took an 
opposite position in an identical dispute that also involved the CAMEL 
trademark and its use in a parody by an anti-smoking association. Unlike 
the European Commission of Human Rights, the French court was ready 
to fully engage in the external evaluation of the compatibility of trademark 
law with freedom of expression and came to the conclusion that freedom of 
expression justified the use of a trademark for the purposes of criticism.224 
Similarly, in other jurisdictions, starting in the early 2000s, courts began 
giving preference to freedom of expression in cases on parodic use—for 
social criticism—of rightsholders’ well-known brands.225 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the Commission of Human Rights was 
of the opinion that only in exceptional circumstances could a trademark 
owner be obliged to accept a breach of his rights resulting from 
unauthorized trademark use. This position was confirmed less than one 
year after the decision in CAMEL—another case concerning trademark use 
for socially important purposes—this time in drug prescriptions.226 
The applicants were a physician, a pharmacist, and a medical 
insurance fund and wanted to proceed with a specific manner of prescribing 
drugs. They planned to recommend the use of the drug Tanderil “or 
equivalent other product” from an agreed list of drugs that were medically 
and pharmaceutically considered equivalent. The list was drawn up by a 
                                                           
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 CNMTR v. Société JT, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e 
civ., Oct. 19, 2006, Bull. civ. II, No. 1601 (Fr.). For an overview of a number of other French 
decisions that allowed freedom of expression to prevail in cases of trademark parodies, see 
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual 
Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 268 (2004); Christophe 
Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression—The Proportionality of Criticism, 38 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 317 (2007). 
225 See, on the parodic reproduction of a brewery’s trademark on T-shirts for the purpose of 
criticizing racial exploitation: Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. African Breweries Int’l 
(Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark Int’l 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) at 35–36 (S. Afr.), and, on artistic 
use of Louis Vuitton’s design in a painting that is critical of society’s consumerism: GHDHA 
4 mei 2011, KG ZA 11-294 2011, 389526 m.nt. (Nadia Plesner/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) 
(Neth.). 
226 Nijs v. Netherlands, App. No. 15497/89 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1992), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22docname%22:[%22Nijs%20v.%20Netherlands%22],%2
2itemid%22:[%22001-1355%22]}. For more on this case, see SAKULIN, supra note 216, at 
259–61. 
49
Geiger and Izyumenko: Shaping Intellectual Property Rights Through Human Rights Adjudic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
576 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
designated Dutch authority—the Netherlands Commission Information 
Drug Prices227—and consisted of registered brand names and names of 
generic drugs. The applicants requested Ciba-Geigy, a pharmaceutical 
company that owned the trademark and name Tanderil in the Benelux, to 
provide them with a declaration that this procedure for prescribing drugs (to 
which the applicants sought to give publicity) was not contrary to the law and 
that the company would refrain from legal proceedings challenging it. 
Following Ciba-Geigy’s refusal to agree, the applicants initiated court 
proceedings seeking a declaratory judgment on the same issue. Their claim, 
however, was rejected in all instances.  
Domestic courts based their decisions on the Benelux Court’s 
interpretation of the relevant provision of the Uniform Benelux Trademark 
Act. The courts stated that the use of a trademark in such a way that its 
owner would suffer damages was only permitted if such use could be 
justified by exceptional circumstances, which were not present in the case at 
hand. 
The applicants complained before the European Commission of 
Human Rights that the domestic courts’ decision not to declare the drug 
prescription procedure lawful was contrary to Article 10 of the ECHR. As 
in the French case involving Camel and an anti-smoking association, the 
Commission rejected the challenge, finding that “the applicants could 
achieve their aim of reducing medical costs by phrasing medical 
prescriptions in such a way that the rights of trademark owners are 
respected, namely by the mere use of generic names in medical 
prescriptions.”228 Accordingly, “the fact that it was not permissible for the 
applicants to use and recommend the particular manner of drafting 
prescriptions [was] to be regarded as a proportionate restriction prescribed 
by law and [could] therefore be considered necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of the rights of others.”229 
As with the first ECHR cases on copyright and freedom of 
expression, the above-discussed approach of the Commission in Article 10 
decisions involving trademarks did not face a positive response in the 
literature.230 It is, however, notable that, in the Camel case, the ECtHR 
admitted that “[t]he decision of the Austrian courts prohibiting the 
applicants from using the words ‘CAMEL’ or ‘KAMEL’ as well as a 
particular slogan and picture in their publicity against smoking constitute[d] 
                                                           
227 See Jonathan P. Man et al., De Commissie Voorlichting Prijzen Geneesmiddelen, 114 
PHARMACEUTISCH WEEKBLAD SCI. EDITION 671 (1979). 




230 See SAKULIN, supra note 216, at 259–61, 284–86. 
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an interference with their right to freedom of expression.”231 The court had, 
therefore, allowed the freedom of expression defense as an external limit to 
trademark law.  
Furthermore, although the Convention institutions found no 
violation in the free speech and trademark cases, nowadays, the court could 
decide similar disputes differently. This would be in line with the idea that 
the Convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions.”232 New realities might require paying greater 
attention to freedom of expression interests in the context of unauthorized 
trademark use than was considered necessary at the beginning of the 1990s. 
One factor pointing in this direction is the change in the judiciary’s position 
on the relationship between trademarks and freedom of expression in 
several jurisdictions. As noted above, national courts (for example, the 
French Supreme Court) are no longer reluctant to reconsider the scope of 
trademark protection through recourse to external freedom of expression 
checks and balances. 
2. Refusal of Trademark Registration—A Challenge to the Trademark 
Applicant’s Freedom of Expression? 
Unauthorized use is not the sole instance in which trademark 
protection might impact freedom of expression. A quite separate issue arises 
when national trademark offices refuse to register the marks of potential 
trademark holders on grounds that such signs are either “contrary to public 
policy or to accepted principles of morality”233 or considered to be 
deceptive.234 In this context, trademark applicants usually claim freedom of 
expression to support their freedom to use the signs as trademarks.235 With 
                                                           
231 Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher v. Austria, No. 17200/90 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1991), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":
["no%2017200/90"],"itemid":["001-124510"]}. 
232 See, e.g., ECtHR, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, Feb. 18, 1999, 
CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002483394, para. 39. 
233 On the E.U. level, this ground for refusing trademark registration is enshrined in 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark (Text with EEA relevance), 
art. 7(1)(f), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, [hereinafter Commission Regulation 2017/1001] and Article 
4(1)(f) of the Directive (EU) No. 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 2015 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade 
Marks (Text with EEA relevance), 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1 [hereinafter Directive (EU) No. 
2015/2436]. 
234 Commission Regulation No. 2017/1001, supra note 233, art. 7(1); Directive (EU) No. 
2015/2436, supra note 233, art. 4(1)(g).  
235 See Christophe Geiger & Leonardo M. Pontes, Trade Mark Registration, Public Policy, 
Morality and Fundamental Rights, in 20 YEARS OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL AT EUIPO, 
ANNIVERSARY BOOK, CELEBRATING THE PAST, LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FUTURE 96 
(Alicante ed., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009170 [https://perma.cc/E4WE-PWRV]; 
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respect to deceptive marks, the Strasbourg Court recently considered 
whether the refusal to register deceptive marks violates the freedom of 
expression of trademark applicants. The case concerned the figurative sign 
“CRUCIFIX,” sought to be registered in Romania.236 The mark was a 
combination of a drawing237 and the word “crucifix” in a design intended to 
cover legal services. The National Trademark and Patent Office of Romania 
(OSIM) refused registration on the grounds that the mark was deceptive238 
and contrary to public order and morality.239 With regards to the mark’s 
deceptiveness, OSIM observed that the church enjoyed a high level of 
public trust, and because of this trust, the use of the “CRUCIFIX” mark for 
legal services could mislead the public into believing that such services were 
provided by this religious organization. Regarding public order 
requirement, OSIM found that the mark’s registration would have infringed 
provisions of the National Law on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious 
Objects,240 according to which the church alone had a monopoly on the 
manufacturing and marketing of crucifixes.  
The applicant challenged OSIM’s decision before the County 
Court of Bucharest, alleging a violation of freedom of expression. He also 
claimed that he was discriminated against insofar as OSIM had accepted the 
registration of other marks containing similar graphic elements. The county 
                                                           
Jonathan Griffiths, Is There a Right to an Immoral Trademark?, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 423 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008); Lisa P. Ramsey, A 
Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 16 TRADEMARK REP. 797 (2016); Enrico 
Bonadio, Brands, Morality and Public Policy: Some Reflections on the Ban on Registration 
of Controversial Trademarks, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 39 (2015); Susan Snedden, 
Immoral Trade Marks in the UK and at OHIM: How Would the Redskins Dispute be 
Decided There?, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 270 (2016). 
236 ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312 (available only in French). 
237 The drawing depicted a stylized cross with floral elements, placed on a base that read 
“CRUCIFIX.” The cross was surrounded by a crown in the shape of the letter “C,” 
representing stylized laurel leaves. 
238 Romanian Law No. 84/1998 of April 15, 1998, on Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications, art. 5(1)(f), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=207374 
[https://perma.cc/R35N-VKMJ] (English translation by the WIPO). 
239 Id., art. 5(1)(i). Note that the European Union’s First Trademarks Directive—First Council 
Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1—had not yet been transposed into Romanian 
law at the time of the proceedings in the applicant’s case. Article 3(2)(b) of that Directive 
stated that “[a]ny Member State may provide that a trade mark shall not be registered or, if 
registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid where and to the extent that . . . the trade 
mark covers a sign of high symbolic value, in particular a religious symbol.” This provision 
can be currently found in Article 4(3)(b) of Directive (EU) No. 2015/2436, supra note 233. 
240 Romanian Law No. 103/1992 on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects, § 1(2) 
(1992). 
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court held for the applicant and ordered registration of the mark.241 It 
concluded that the Law on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects 
was not applicable in the present case since it concerned only the 
manufacture and marketing of objects of worship. Consequently, the 
registration of the mark did not violate any of the social values defended by 
public policy. With regard to the alleged misleading character of the mark 
by OSIM, the court found that the mark, combined with the legal services 
for which its registration was sought, was not likely to mislead the public as 
to the nature, origin, or quality of these services. 
OSIM lodged an appeal. It argued that the provisions of the Law 
on Manufacture and Marketing of Religious Objects were part of public 
policy and, therefore, the owner of the mark could mislead the public into 
believing that there was a connection between the applicant and the church. 
In the final judgment of the case, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed 
the action.242 The court of appeals, after examining the drawing 
accompanying the mark, found that the “average reference” consumer 
perceived its religious character as a priority and could, therefore, believe 
that a link existed between the church and the owner of the mark. Given 
the broad involvement of religious institutions in charitable and aid activities 
in various fields, it was possible, in the court’s opinion, that religious 
organizations could also provide legal assistance to their believers. Thus, the 
court concluded that the trademark applicant could benefit from public 
confidence in the church, which made the mark deceptive, and it was, 
therefore, unnecessary to examine the conformity of the mark with public 
order and morality. Finally, the Bucharest Court of Appeal found that the 
refusal to register the trademark did not infringe ECHR provisions on 
freedom of expression and non-discrimination. On the latter point, the 
court noted that examples cited by the applicant were irrelevant since those 
marks contained compound words and complex drawings, which departed 
from religious symbols.243 
The applicant complained to the Strasbourg Court that the choice 
of the name and graphic representation of the mark “CRUCIFIX” was a 
matter of his freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 of the 
ECHR), and, by refusing his application, the domestic authorities infringed 
                                                           
241 County Court of Bucharest, judgment of June 8, 2010 (Rom.) (cited in ECtHR, Dor v. 
Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015, CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para. 
18). 
242 Bucharest Court of Appeal, judgment of June 21, 2011 (Rom.). 
243 One of the judges on the panel dissented and argued in favor of dismissing the appeal. He 
considered that the application for registration could be rejected only if it was contrary to 
public order or morality. Recalling that public order concerns the functioning of the state 
apparatus and that Romania is a secular state where religion is separated from the state, the 
dissenting judge held that religious symbols could not be part of the public order calculus. 
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on his freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR). Because the court 
observed at the outset that the present case should be examined solely under 
Article 10 of the Convention as concerning the commercial use of a mark, 
the ECtHR rejected the applicant’s claim under this provision as manifestly 
ill-founded.244 It held that the dismissal of the application for trademark 
registration amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression insofar as the mark constituted an important element 
of the applicant’s advertising strategy,245 as advertising is one of the forms of 
commercial speech protected by the Convention. However, such 
interference was in accordance with the law because the relevant ground of 
refusal was provided in Romania’s National Law on Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications,246 pursued a legitimate aim (protection of the 
public against false advertising),247 and was proportionate to this aim. 
Regarding the proportionality of the measure, the ECtHR observed the 
applicant had: 
in no way demonstrated the existence of a link between the legal 
services which it intended to provide to the public under the 
contested mark and the religious symbol of the crucifix. On the 
contrary, he confined himself to asserting that such a choice 
related to his freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well 
as his freedom of expression.248 
In these circumstances, taking into account the particularly wide margin of 
discretion which the national authorities enjoy in regulating commercial and 
advertising speech, the national judges were justified in rejecting the 
applicant’s claim.249  
The ECtHR has also recently addressed the potential implications 
of refusing to register trademarks contrary to public policy and morality on 
the trademark applicants’ freedom of expression.250 The case at issue, Csibi 
                                                           
244 ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para. 57 (available only in French). 
245 Id. para. 42. 
246 Id. paras. 45–46. 
247 Id. para. 47. 
248 Id. para. 53, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 58 (Christophe 
Geiger et al. eds., 1992). 
249 Id. paras. 51, 54, 56. 
250 For possible implications of this ground for refusal on freedom of expression rights not of 
the trademark applicant, but of the user, see Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo (Eur. Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) Court, Apr. 6, 2017), https://report.eftacourt.int/2017/e516/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6SD-TGF8]. In this case, the court sought to use the public-policy-
morality ground for refusal to protect from “appropriation,” by means of trademark 
registration, works in the public domain (notably, works of art). Although the court, in 
principle, accepted that the ground for refusal due to morality and public policy can, in 
certain situations, achieve the goal of keeping works in the public domain, it also confirmed 
that this ground for refusal does not provide protection to works in the public domain. In 
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v. Romania,251 concerned the Romanian trademark registration authority’s 
refusal to register the applicant’s trademark that read “Szekely Land is not 
Romania!”252 According to the Romanian trademark office, claiming that 
Szekely Land (an unofficial territory name for three Romanian counties) 
was not part of Romania could lead to the idea of territorial separation. The 
trademark office found this to be contrary to the constitutional provisions 
on the unitary character of the Romanian State and, consequently, to the 
national trademark law that does not allow the registration of trademarks 
contrary to public order.253 
The applicant contested the office’s reasoning, which was 
subsequently affirmed by the courts, before the ECtHR, contending that the 
domestic authorities had unlawfully restricted the voicing of the applicant’s 
strong belief contained in the expression at issue on public order grounds.254 
According to the applicant, his statement concerned a fictitious land that 
could be defined only historically and ethnographically, not politically.255 
The Strasbourg Court, however, was not persuaded and found that 
the interference with the applicant’s right was justified under the national 
trademark law provision excluding trademarks that are contrary to public 
order or good morals from protection and registration. The court reasoned 
that such an interference pursued the legitimate aims of protecting 
Romania’s territorial integrity, national security, and public order.256  
                                                           
order to be excluded from registration on this ground, works of art have to pass the threshold 
of “enjoy[ing] a particular status as prominent parts of a nation’s cultural heritage.” Id. para. 
92. However, the court made no reference to the right to freedom of expression. The 
argument of “the general interest in protecting creations of the mind from commercial greed” 
was used instead, with reference also to the freedom of the arts. Id. para. 65. For comments 
on this judgment, see Martin Senftleben, Vigeland and the Status of Cultural Concerns in 
Trade Mark Law—The EFTA Court Develops More Effective Tools for the Preservation of 
the Public Domain, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 683 (2017); Thomas 
H. Nicholson, EFTA and EEA: Is a (Famous) Work of Art Contrary to Accepted Principles 
of Morality or Public Policy Under Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive?, KLUWER 
TRADEMARK BLOG (Sept. 4, 2017), http://trademarkblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/09/04/efta-
eea-famous-work-art-contrary-accepted-principles-morality-public-policy-article-3-trade-
mark-directive/ [https://perma.cc/CBS7-SXXT]. More generally, on the insufficiency of 
current trademark protection of the general interest in keeping public domain works free, 
see Lotte Anemaet, The Public Domain is Under Pressure—Why We Should Not Rely on 
Empirical Data When Assessing Trade Mark Distinctiveness, 47 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. 
& COMPETITION L. 303 (2016); Geiger & Pontes, supra note 235. 
251 ECtHR, Csibi v. Romania (dec.), No. 16632/12, 4 June 2019, 
CE:ECHR:2019:0604DEC001663212. 
252 “Szekelyfold nem România!” in Hungarian. 
253 ECtHR, Csibi v. Romania (dec.), no. 16632/12, June 4, 2019, CE:ECHR:2019:0604 
DEC001663212, para. 7. 
254 Id. para. 8. 
255 Id. para. 35. 
256 Id. para. 41. 
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Concerning the necessity of such an interference, the ECtHR 
refused to “speculate whether the applicant aimed in reality to use the 
trademark in question in order to promote his campaign for the creation of 
a Szekler state.”257 The court observed that the applicant’s complaint “[did] 
not relate to political speech but only refer[red] to the proceedings related 
to the domestic authorities’ refusal to register a trademark” and that “the 
applicant limited his application to these proceedings, . . . [and] the 
arguments related to his alleged political activities were only raised by the 
Government after the communication of his application.”258 
 The court further noted that “the applicant was involved in a 
commercial activity and had used on several types of products the text for 
which he had sought registration as a trademark.”259 Thus, the ECtHR 
appeared to accord particular weight to the fact that the object of the 
applicant’s complaint was the refusal of his trademark “to be used in a 
commercial activity,”260 and not in any other type of speech meriting elevated 
Article 10 protection, such as political or other general interest speech. 
In view of this consideration, the ECtHR found that “the domestic 
judges did not overstep their broad margin of appreciation when they found 
that public reasons outweighed the applicant’s eventual right to freedom of 
expression.”261 It also ruled that “the applicant has not proved that the refusal 
to register the trademark in question had had any impact on his possible 
commercial activities.”262 The court, therefore, concluded that “the refusal 
of registration was . . . proportionate in the circumstances of the present 
case, which disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention” and rejected the application as manifestly ill-founded.263 
Nonetheless, the seemingly prudent stance of the Strasbourg Court 
on the impact of trademark-registration refusals on the free speech rights of 
trademark applicants might not be a final say on the issue, at least not for all 
trademark registrations, particularly, insofar as “immoral” trademarks 
(rather than trademarks contrary to public order) are concerned. Indeed, 
the Strasbourg Court’s case law generally suggests greater tolerance towards 
speech that “offend[s], shock[s] or disturb[s].”264 According to the court, 
“[s]uch are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
                                                           
257 Id. para. 42. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. para. 43. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. para. 44. 
262 Id. para. 45 (citing ECtHR, Dor v. Romania (dec.), no. 55153/12, Aug. 25, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:0825DEC005515312, para. 55). 
263 Id. para. 46. 
264 ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom, no. 5493/72, Dec. 7, 1976, 
CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, para. 49. 
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without which there is no ‘democratic society.’”265 Hence, at least in theory, 
any future challenge of registration refusals of “immoral” rather than 
criminal-law-violative trademarks before the ECtHR might lead to a 
radically different outcome than that reached in the Csibi case.  
For instance, in one of its recent pronouncements on the 
permissibility of restrictions on commercial speech on public-morals 
grounds, the ECtHR found in favor of the “speaker.”266 In particular, the 
court held that the imposition of a fine on a clothing company267 for using 
images of Jesus and Mary in its advertising campaign was not sufficiently 
justified.  
Then again, it is unlikely that the ECtHR will rule that offensive 
trademarks should always be registered, as the court usually adheres to a 
case-by-case approach. The ECtHR is also unlikely to allow the registration 
of trademarks that can be deemed to undermine other values protected by 
the Convention—as might be the case regarding, for example, racist signs or 
messages. Hence, there are many reasons to suggest that, in Europe, the 
approach to the freedom of expression implications of the refusal to register 
trademarks on morality or public policy grounds is likely to be far less 
“radical” than that recently taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court in Matal v. 
Tam268 and Iancu v. Brunetti.269 In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that refusing to register the so-called “disparaging,” “scandalous,” or 
“immoral” trademarks violates trademark applicants’ free speech rights, 
protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
Lately, the CJEU has also addressed the issue. Until recently, the 
General Court of the CJEU—one of the two courts of the judicial branch of 
the European Union alongside the CJEU itself—had always rejected 
applicants’ free expression arguments for “immoral” trademarks. The 
General Court reasoned that such applicants had either failed to properly 
argue that the refusal of their application was not covered by limitations on 
freedom of expression provided in Article 10(2) of the ECHR,270 or that the 
                                                           
265 Id. 
266 ECtHR, Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, no. 69317/14, Jan. 30, 2018, 
CE:ECHR:2018:0130JUD006931714. 
267 The company was fined under the Lithuanian Law on Advertising that prohibited 
advertising contrary to public morals. 
268 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
269 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
270 Case T-232/10, Couture Tech Ltd v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
[OHIM], para. 71 (July 2, 2019), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
69cc3bfd-9f24-44c9-9995-dd2ed51e5709 T-232/10. This case involved the OHIM’s refusal 
to register the Soviet coat of arms as a Community trademark because of the ban on former 
USSR symbols in certain E.U. Member States. 
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refusal did not prevent the applicants from continuing to market their 
products with the signs in question as non-registered marks.271  
The latest in the line of such cases decided by the Court of Justice 
in February 2020 has, however, changed this trend.272 The case concerned 
the refusal by the E.U. Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to register the 
word-sign “Fack Ju Göhte” as contrary to the accepted principles of morality 
because the word “fack ju” (identical to the English expression “fuck you”) 
was expected to be perceived as shocking and vulgar by the German 
public.273 The sign referred to the title of a successful German comedic film 
produced by the applicant, the Constantin Film Produktion company. In a 
decision from January 2018, the CJEU’s General Court habitually rejected 
the trademark applicant’s freedom of expression claim, adding that “a 
constant concern to preserve freedom of expression” which is present “in 
the field of art, culture and literature . . . does not exist in the field of trade 
marks.”274 The Court of Justice, where the case was appealed, has, however, 
explicitly discarded the General Court’s argument.275 According to the Court 
of Justice, “freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must . . . be taken into account 
when applying Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation No 207/2009 [the ground for 
refusal related to public policy or to accepted principles of morality].”276 
                                                           
271 See Case T-417/10, Cortés del Valle López v. OHIM, para. 26 (Mar. 9, 2012), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010TJ0417 (available only in French and Spanish) (noting 
that OHIM’s refusal to register the figurative mark, “¡Que buenu ye! Hijoputa,” was 
perceived as an inherently offensive and shocking expression by the Spanish public of the 
E.U.); Case T-54/13, Efag Trade Mark Co. v. OHIM, para. 44 (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144483&pageIndex=
0&doclang=DE&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2750488 (available only in French 
and German) (OHIM’s refusal to register a figurative sign with the words “FICKEN 
LIQUORS” as it is considered to be a vulgar and obscene term in German). 
272 Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual 
Property Office [EUIPO] (Feb. 27, 2020), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=223843&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=2550080. 
273 This was the general ground for refusal of Article 7(1)(f) of the E.U. Trademark Regulation 
No. 207/2009, in effect at the material time (currently Article 7(1)(f) of Commission 
Regulation 2017/1001). 
274 Case T-69/17, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual 
Property Office [EUIPO] (Jan. 24, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=198722&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=2550306 (appeal before the Court of Justice) (available only in French and 
German). 
275 Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual 
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This was also the position of the Advocate General who, in his 
opinion on this case, found that “[f]reedom of expression does indeed play 
a role in trade mark law.”277 Hence, to regard freedom of expression as 
irrelevant to the field of trademarks (as held by the General Court) is “clearly 
incorrect.”278  
Nonetheless, by apparently suggesting that the free speech rights of 
trademark applicants must be balanced against the need to preserve public 
morals or other competing interests in each particular case, both the 
Advocate General and, following him, the Court of Justice appear to have 
taken a more cautious position than that adopted by U.S. courts. Thus, no 
automatic restriction on free speech can be imposed on trademark law 
provisions prohibiting registrations of immoral marks and other marks 
contrary to public policy.279 The Advocate General has also suggested that 
“although freedom of expression, as well as other fundamental rights 
potentially at stake, must be taken into account in the overall balancing 
exercise, the protection of freedom of expression is not the primary goal of 
trade mark protection.”280 
The CJEU’s position can, thus, be characterized as being much in 
line with the ECtHR’s approach towards the freedom of expression 
challenges to refusals of trademark applications. Contrary to the position 
taken in the U.S., in Europe, the approach would greatly depend on the 
circumstances of each particular case, such as, the mark’s “offensiveness,”281 
the severity of harm to freedom of expression of the trademark applicant,282 
and so on.283 
                                                           
277 Case C-240/18 P, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v. European Union Intellectual 
Property Office [EUIPO], para. 47 (July 2, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf;jsessionid=4232D93A774C5379B6048FC908A5423C?text=&docid=215701
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7290447 (opinion of 
Advocate General Bobek). 
278 Id. para. 57. 
279 Id. paras. 56–57.  
280 Id. para. 57. 
281 For example, in the case of a Lithuanian clothing company, the ECtHR gave particular 
consideration to the public authorities’ failure to justify why the reference to religious symbols 
in advertising was offensive. ECtHR, Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, no. 69317/14, Jan. 30, 
2018, CE:ECHR:2018:0130JUD006931714, para. 79. 
282 Arguably, fining a company for its advertising campaign amounts to a direct punishment 
of expression; whereas, the refusal of trademark registration is rather a measure to discourage 
certain speech and does not rise to the level of a direct ban on expression. For further 
discussion on the degree of harm caused to freedom of expression by any potential refusal 
of trademark registration, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Non-Traditional Trademarks and Inherently 
Valuable Expression, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL TRADE MARKS 337 
(Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds., 2018). 
283 For a comparative approach between the United States and the European Union, see 
Geiger & Pontes, supra note 235. 
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IV. RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COPYRIGHT 
ENFORCEMENT AND AS A BASIS FOR MORAL RIGHTS 
The intellectual property issues that arose before the Strasbourg 
Court regarding the right to privacy—guaranteed by the right to respect for 
private and family life found in Article 8 of the ECHR—concerned: the 
manner of executing certain search orders on allegations of copyright 
violation (Section IV.A) and the possible extension to moral rights of Article 
8 of the ECHR (Section IV.B). 
A. Search Orders and Their Effects on the Right to the Respect for Private 
Life 
The Strasbourg Court first examined the compatibility of search 
orders (as measures against copyright infringement) with the Convention’s 
privacy provision in Chappell v. United Kingdom284 in 1989. The case 
concerned a challenge to the issue and execution of an interim relief known 
as an “Anton Piller order”285 to search the applicant’s premises that served 
as both his office and home and to seize property that was subject to civil 
copyright infringement proceedings. Following the applicant’s unsuccessful 
attempts to set the order aside, he applied to the EctHR, arguing, first, that 
the Anton Piller orders, as they existed in English law, were in breach of 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Under the same provision, he further contested the 
way in which the order was served and how the subsequent search was 
carried out in his case.  
In particular, he alleged that the grant and the execution of the 
order were neither in conformity with English law nor proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, that is, the protection of the rights of others under 
the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR. The applicant mainly relied 
on the fact that the two searches—one regarding the “pirated” videos and 
another concerning obscene ones—were allowed and conducted at the same 
time, which allegedly distracted him from properly supervising the 
execution of the order. 
In its March 1985 decision on the admissibility of the application, 
the European Commission of Human Rights dismissed the applicant’s 
complaint about the legitimacy of Anton Piller orders, considering that it 
was not called upon to examine, in the abstract, whether a particular aspect 
                                                           
284 ECtHR, Chappell v. United Kingdom, no. 10461/83, Mar. 30, 1989, 
CE:ECHR:1989:0330JUD001046183. On this case, see Ann Sherlock, European Court of 
Human Rights—Execution of an “Anton Piller Order” and Article 8, 14 EUR. L. REV. 476 
(1989); Lawrence Collins, Anton Piller Orders and Fundamental Rights, 106 LAW Q. REV. 
173 (1989); Ruth B. Charteris, Sun Sets on Dawn Raids, 34 SCOTS L. TIMES 271 (2000). 
285 Named so after a case in which its use was approved by the Court of Appeal. See Anton 
Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd. [1976] 1 All ER 779 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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of domestic law was or was not in conformity with the Convention.286 
However, the Commission referred the applicant’s complaint to the 
Strasbourg Court because of the manner in which the order was executed 
in his particular case.  
The court, judging on the merits, held that there had been no 
violation of Article 8.287 According to the EctHR, the interference with the 
applicant’s home and privacy could be justified under Article 8(2) as aiming 
to protect the plaintiffs’ copyright against unauthorized infringement. The 
court noted that the grant and the execution of the Anton Piller order in the 
applicant’s case complied with English law. The basic terms and conditions 
for the grant of the order were laid down with sufficient precision to be 
foreseeable.288 As such, the order was accompanied with adequate and 
effective safeguards against arbitrary interference and abuse.289 Those 
safeguards included a short term grant for the execution of the order, 
restrictions regarding the time and the number of persons by whom the 
order could be executed, and a specified purpose for which seized materials 
could be used.  
Moreover, a variety of remedies were available to the applicant in 
case of any wrongdoing by the plaintiffs. Although the court admitted that 
the mode of execution could be considered “unfortunate and regrettable”290 
as it involved certain shortcomings in procedure,291 it nevertheless concluded 
that the grant and execution of the order were necessary and proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued. 
However, the court reached a different conclusion in two much 
more recent applications where violations of Article 8 had been established. 
The applicants in the first case,292 Mr. and Ms. Prezhdarovi, were a married 
couple who ran a computer club in their garage. On February 2, 2005, the 
                                                           
286 Chappell v. United Kingdom (dec.), App. No. 10461/83 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Mar. 14, 
1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2210461/83%22],%22itemid%22
:[%22001-57459%22]}. 
287 ECtHR, Chappell v. United Kingdom, no. 10461/83, Mar. 30, 1989, 
CE:ECHR:1989:0330JUD001046183, para. 67. 
288 Id. paras. 52–57. 
289 Id. paras. 59–61. 
290 Id. para. 63. 
291 These included the fact that Mr. Chappell was not afforded a proper opportunity to refuse 
entry to his premises and the fact that his premises were searched, simultaneously, by the 
police and the plaintiffs. 
292 ECtHR, Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, Sept. 30, 2014, 
CE:ECHR:2014:0930JUD000842905. On this case, see Dirk Voorhoof, European Court of 
Human Rights: Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, 10 IRIS 1(Oct. 1, 2014), http://merlin.obs.coe.int/
article.php?id=15036 [https://perma.cc/KV7M-F2XB]; Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, GLOBAL 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, https://globalfreedomofexpression.
columbia.edu/cases/prezhdarovi-v-bulgaria/ [https://perma.cc/69ZB-MYN3] (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2020). 
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district prosecutor ordered a search of the applicants’ club upon suspecting 
that they had installed some games on the computers they were renting to 
their clients without the necessary software license for reproduction and 
distribution.293 To execute the prosecutor’s order, on February 21, 2005, the 
police searched the club and seized five computers containing computer 
programs, computer games, and films. Thereafter, criminal proceedings 
against Mr. Prezhdarov were instigated.294  
Afterwards, a report on the inspection was sent to a judge who 
approved it and briefly noted that there were pressing circumstances that 
justified an immediate search and seizure as the only means by which the 
necessary evidence could be collected and preserved.295 Mr. Prezhdarov’s 
application against the search and seizure operation, including a claim that 
the computers contained letters and personal information about friends and 
clients, was considered inadmissible.296 In the subsequent criminal 
proceedings, Mr. Prezhdarov was convicted of unlawful distribution of 
computer programs, computer games, and movies.297 The computers, which 
had been retained during the criminal proceedings, were also confiscated. 
The applicants complained to the EctHR, claiming that the 
circumstances in their case were not sufficiently pressing as to justify an on-
the-spot inspection and search and seizure of their computers. They further 
maintained that the operation was unnecessarily extended to cover private 
information contained in the retained computers, which Ms. Prezhdarova 
had used for her business activities. Lastly, the applicants complained that 
they had been denied access to an effective remedy in this regard.298 
Ruling on a violation of the second paragraph of Article 8 of the 
ECHR, the court found that the actions of the police at the applicants’ 
computer club and the subsequent retention of the computers as an 
interference with the applicants’ private life were not in accordance with the 
law.299 Assuming that the actions of the police had some basis in domestic 
law—because the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 provided that, in 
certain circumstances, the police could conduct search and seizure 
operations300—the court nevertheless held that the law did not provide 
adequate safeguards against arbitrary conduct.  
                                                           
293 ECtHR, Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, Sept. 30, 2014, CE:ECHR:2014: 
0930JUD000842905, paras. 12–13. 
294 Id. paras. 15–17. 
295 Id. para. 20. 
296 Id. para. 21. 
297 Id. para. 25. 
298 Id. para. 54. 
299 Id. para. 51. 
300 Id. para. 44. 
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The EctHR first noted that the circumstances of the case were not 
so exigent as to buttress an immediate police action outside the criminal 
proceedings, particularly because of the lapse of time between the 
prosecutor’s order and the actual police inspection.301 It further held that the 
retrospective judicial review of the search provided no meaningful reasoning 
for the lawfulness or justification of the impugned measure.302 Finally, the 
court concluded that the lack of any consideration of the seized 
information’s relevance to the investigation and of the applicants’ complaint 
regarding the personal character of some of the information stored on the 
computers “rendered the judicial review formalistic and deprived the 
applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse.”303 
The court also found a breach of the “quality of law” requirement304 
from Zosymov v. Ukraine,305 which concerned a police night search on 
suspicion of copyright infringement of the applicant’s office, car, and garage. 
As in the previous case, the search was conducted without prior judicial 
authorization.306 Unlike in Prezhdarovi, however, judicial review was never 
obtained even post factum. According to the Ukrainian rules of criminal 
procedure, this was because “the relevant complaint could only be brought 
within the framework of the criminal trial of the case initiated by the police 
following the disputed visit, in the event that the investigative authority ever 
brought the case to that stage.”307 In the applicant’s case, however, the 
criminal trial was never initiated, despite Mr. Zosymov’s numerous efforts, 
and the relevant criminal proceedings remained stagnant for several years.308 
                                                           
301 Id. para. 45. 
302 Id. paras. 47–48. 
303 Id. para. 49. 
304 As a rule, the ECtHR examines four central questions when an exception to one of the 
qualified Convention rights (such as the right to privacy) is at stake: (1) whether there has 
been an interference with that right; (2) whether it is in accordance with law (the “quality of 
law” requirement); (3) whether it pursues a legitimate aim; and (4) whether it is necessary in 
a democratic society and proportionate to that aim. In the ECHR, the following rights are 
qualified: Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life); Article 9 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); and Article 11 (freedom of 
assembly and association). An analogous four-part test is applied when restrictions on the 
right to property are at stake (Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR). For a further 
discussion, see Steven Greer, The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FILES NO. 15 (1997). Regarding the right to property, 
see Aida Grgić, Zvonimir Mataga, Matija Longar & Ana Vilfan, The Right to Property Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Its Protocols, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
HANDBOOKS, NO. 10 (2007). 
305 ECtHR, Zosymov v. Ukraine, no. 4322/06, July 7, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0707JUD000432206. 
306 Id. para. 61. 
307 Id. para. 61. 
308 Id.  
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According to the Strasbourg Court, in this situation, “domestic law did not 
provide requisite guarantees against arbitrariness in respect of the police’s 
actions . . . and did not meet the requirement of quality of law for the 
purposes of the Convention.”309 
B. Moral Rights Grounded in the Convention’s Right to Privacy 
Legal scholars are of the opinion that moral rights—even without 
any case law on point—could be protected by Article 8 of the Convention 
on the protection of privacy.310 The fact that the Strasbourg Court advanced 
certain arguments in support of moral rights based on Article 8 in relation 
to trademarks reinforces this contention. 
The case at issue concerned a dispute in connection with the right 
of reproduction of the portrait and name of the applicants’ great-
grandfather, a prominent factory owner, in the brewery’s trademark.311 The 
applicants passed a copy of the portrait to the local museum, which, in turn, 
passed it to the brewery. In the action brought against the brewery, the 
applicants asked to remove their ancestor’s name and portrait from the beer 
advertisements because those interfered with their right to confidentiality of 
family life.312 The domestic courts, in all instances, dismissed the applicants’ 
complaints. As a result, the applicants applied to the ECtHR, alleging that 
the commercial use of their ancestor’s portrait and name caused them 
distress, which encroached on their private and family life under Article 8 
of the ECHR. 
The Strasbourg Court found that there had been no interference with 
the applicants’ human rights. First, the court observed that “the applicants 
had themselves passed the portrait to the museum,”313 which led the court 
to conclude that “they had agreed, in principle, that the portrait may be seen 
by others.”314 The ECtHR further noted:  
[T]he portrait was posted on produce of the brewery once 
founded by the applicants’ ancestor. In the Court’s opinion, by 
using the portrait in this manner the brewery meant to revere his 
memory as a master brewer rather than insult the applicants’ 
                                                           
309 Id. para. 62. 
310 See, e.g., Josef Drexl, Constitutional Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights in the European 
Union—Between Privacy, Property and the Regulation of the Economy, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND PRIVATE LAW: PRIVACY AS AUTONOMY 173–74 (Katja S. Ziegler ed., 2007); Geiger, 
“Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 5, at 383. 
311 ECtHR, Vorsina v. Russia (dec.), no. 66801/01, Feb. 5, 2004, 
CE:ECHR:2004:0205DEC006680101. On this case, see Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 694. 
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feelings towards him. Nothing suggests that the rather distant ties 
between the applicants and the relative were thereby distorted.315 
Welkowitz observed that “the court’s finding that the use was not 
undignified indicates that a less dignified use (and the court did not define 
what that would be) might have led to a different result.”316 Thus, the 
reasoning of the court points to a quasi-moral-rights argument that might, in 
the future, receive further development under ECtHR case law on Article 8 
and copyright law. This is probable since, in certain countries, the link 
between moral rights and personality rights is very clear. For example, in 
Germany, moral rights are described as “‘authors’ personality rights” 
(Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte).317 
 
V. NON-DISCRIMINATION: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR COPYRIGHT 
RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF BUSINESSES AND PATENT 
APPEAL PROCEEDINGS 
The last right in the catalogue of ECHR material guarantees that 
came into play in the context of intellectual property rights is the right to 
non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR. In the IP context, 
this guarantee was raised before the Convention institutions only on two 
occasions. 
The first pertained to the above-discussed dispute brought to the 
Commission of Human Rights by the Dutch publisher of weekly “general 
interest’” magazine, De Geïllustreerde Pers N.V.318 Apart from the freedom 
of expression claim, the publisher also invoked Article 14 of the ECHR, 
contending that it was discriminated against because under the national 
broadcasting and copyright legislation, broadcasting organizations and some 
publishers were allowed, unlike the applicant company, to publish complete 
program information or at least summaries thereof.319 
As to the alleged discrimination between the applicant company 
and the broadcasting organizations, the Commission took into 
consideration the nature of the broadcasting organizations, which, although 
performing a public service, were companies created under private law.320 
They were allocated broadcasting time in relation to their membership and 
                                                           
315 Id. 
316 Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 694. 
317 Geiger, “Constitutionalizing” Intellectual Property Law?, supra note 5, at 386 n. 72. 
318 D.G.P.N.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. July 6, 1976), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%225178/71%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-3155%22]}. 
319 Id. para. 2. 
320 Id. para. 101. 
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the number of subscriptions to their program magazines.321 The profits from 
those subscriptions were also used for financing the broadcasting activities 
of the organizations.322 The European Commission of Human Rights, 
therefore, considered that there were reasonable justifications for the 
differential treatment.323  
As to the alleged discrimination against the applicant company 
when compared to daily newspapers and newspapers appearing at least 
three times a week, the Commission found that there had been no 
differential treatment due to the incomparable features of these two kinds 
of press publications.324 In particular, it pointed out that the applicant 
company sought to publish complete lists, and not merely summaries of 
programs, whereas the other newspapers were allowed to publish only the 
short summaries.325 Finally, the Commission rejected the allegation of 
discrimination involving foreign weekly magazines. It held that, even 
assuming that the publications of the applicant company and the foreign 
magazines were comparable, they nevertheless pursued different aims. On 
a reciprocal basis, foreign publications were allowed an exchange of 
program information with broadcasting organizations abroad in order to 
serve those segments of the public who were interested in foreign 
broadcasts.326 Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 14 of the 
ECHR.327 
The second occasion on which the Commission was called upon to 
consider intellectual property regulation in light of Article 14 concerned a 
case in which the applicant company challenged the fact that the appeal 
procedure in patent disputes was different from the appeal procedure in 
other disputes of a pecuniary nature.328 In this case, unlike in the previous 
case, the Commission did not even examine whether a different treatment 
was justified by a legitimate aim, having found that the claimed 
discriminatory circumstances were not comparable.329 Additionally, since 
Article 14 of the ECHR only applied to differences between parties whose 
situations were analogous, the applicant company’s complaint was rejected 
as manifestly ill-founded.330 
                                                           
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. para. 102. 
324 Id. paras. 104–05. 
325 Id. para. 105. 
326 Id. para. 107. 
327 Id. paras. 108–09. 
328 B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2226684/95%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-28112%22]} (available only in French). 
329 Id. para. 3. 
330 Id. 
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VI. FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEES APPLICABLE TO IP PROCEEDINGS 
Apart from material guarantees, the ECHR also provides a number 
of procedural safeguards, at the center of which—without doubt—stands the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The cases concerning fair 
trial are the most numerous in the Strasbourg Court’s practice on IP. These 
cases involve aspects of the previously mentioned procedural guarantee, 
such as: the right of access to court (Section VI.A), the finality of court 
decisions (res judicata) (Section VI.B), the tribunal’s independence and 
impartiality (Section VI.C), the equality of arms and the adversarial nature 
of the proceedings (Section VI.D), rules on the administration of evidence 
(Section VI.E), the oral nature of a hearing (Section VI.F), the right to a 
reasoned judicial decision (Section VI.G), the right to a reasonable duration 
of the proceedings (Section VI.H), certain further safeguards applicable in 
the context of criminal proceedings (Section VI.I), and, finally, the right to 
an effective remedy331 and timely enforcement of a final court decision 
(Section VI.J). Although a comprehensive overview of all instances of the 
interaction of IP with different aspects of the right to a fair trial would go far 
beyond the scope of this article, some of the most prominent examples can 
still be highlighted.332 
A. Access to Courts 
The right of access to the courts played a role in several intellectual 
property cases decided by the ECtHR in relation to the issues of prohibitive 
time-limits,333 certain formal aspects of the appeals procedure,334 questions of 
                                                           
331 The right to an effective remedy is, strictly speaking, a guarantee in its own right and is 
enshrined separately from the Convention’s fair trial provision (Article 6) in Article 13 of the 
ECHR. Note, however, that these two guarantees are closely interrelated, and the E.U. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example, even places them together within the scope of 
the same clause (Article 47 of the Charter). 
332 For further discussion of the intersection of IP and fair trial in Europe, see, an excellent 
article by Jonathan Griffiths, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to a 
Fair Trial, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
supra note 5, at 438. 
333 Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 18, 1994), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2223016/93%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-27230%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); ECtHR, AEPI S.A. v. Greece, no. 
48679/99, Apr. 11, 2002, CE:ECHR:2002:0411JUD004867999 (on copyright) (available 
only in French); ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 33883/06, Apr. 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306 (on copyright, discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 340–356); and ECtHR, Sobczynski v. Poland (dec.), no. 358/04, Sept. 30, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0930DEC000035804 (on patents). 
334 Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. May 18, 1994), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2223016/93%22],%22itemid%22:[%220
01-27230%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 
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jurisdiction,335 allegedly excessive court fees,336 legal costs,337 and unduly 
protracted proceedings.338 Finally, in a number of patent cases, the applicants 
similarly challenged the impossibility of appealing the decisions of the 
Board of Appeal of the EPO to national courts.339 
A recent copyright judgment in the case of Gheorghe v. Romania340 
provides a good illustration of how timeframe restrictions can impede 
effective access to judicial protection. In Gheorghe, the applicant was a 
professional photographer who took a number of photographs of 
landscapes in Călăraşi County in Romania in 1984.341 Although the 
photographs had been commissioned for commercial publication in an 
album, the album was not published, and the photographs were retained by 
a certain F.G., who was in charge of the album project.342 In 2004, the 
applicant found out, by chance, that an album had been published in 1999 
by a company run by F.G., with F.G. credited as the photographer.343 In 
February 2004, claiming F.G. had committed copyright infringement, the 
applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Romanian Copyright Office 
                                                           
25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2225419/94%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]} (on 
designs). 
335 ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004, 
CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (on copyright) (available only in French). 
336 X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]} (on patents, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 357, 359–361); ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98, 
Dec. 13, 2001, CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898 (on patents) (available only in French, 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 358, 362). 
337 ECtHR, Jensen v. Denmark, no. 8693/11, Dec. 13, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD000869311 (on designs, discussed infra text accompanying notes 
363–371). 
338 ECtHR, Kristiansen v. Norway, no. 25498/08, May 2, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808 (on patents, discussed infra text accompanying notes 
372– 379). 
339 Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2227410/95%22],%22itemid%22:  [%220
01-2868%22]}; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 
9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],% 22itemid
%22:[%22001-4410%22]}; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:
[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4408%22]}; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. 
Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204. 
340 ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 33883/06, Apr. 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306. 
341 Id. para. 6.  
342 Id. 
343 Id. para. 7.  
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(RCO). He also joined a civil action to his criminal complaint, seeking 
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.344  
Following an investigation establishing that the applicant’s copyright 
had indeed been infringed, the RCO forwarded the applicant’s complaint 
to the police in November 2004.345 Although the expert report ordered by 
the police also confirmed the applicant’s authorship of the photographs, the 
prosecutor’s office decided not to open a criminal investigation on the 
grounds that the copyright infringement limitation period of five years 
(calculated from the date on which the offense was committed)346 had 
expired in April 2004. The applicant appealed the decision before the trial 
court, which ruled in his favor.347 In particular, the court noted that the 
five-year-limitation period should have been calculated from the date on 
which the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO—which was about 
two months before the end of the five-year term—and not the date on which 
the RCO forwarded the file to the police.  
The court’s conclusion was informed by the specific procedure for 
prosecuting copyright offenses in Romania, whereby only the RCO (and not 
the applicant) can commence a criminal action for copyright infringement. 
This term calculation was, nevertheless, rejected on appeal by the higher 
court,348 which held that the limitation period continued to run until the date 
on which the police received the criminal complaint from the RCO in 
November 2004, which was more than five years after the offense had been 
committed.349 In reaching this conclusion, the higher court made no 
reference to the civil complaint lodged by the applicant. 
The applicant then appealed to the ECtHR, which found that the 
domestic courts’ restrictive interpretation of the limitation period for lodging 
the copyright infringement claim had deprived the applicant of access to a 
remedy that would have enabled him to obtain the compensation claimed. 
While stressing that “the requirement to lodge a judicial claim within a 
statutory time-limit is not, in itself, incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention,” as this requirement serves the legitimate aims of legal certainty 
and proper administration of justice,350 the court nevertheless noted that “the 
right of access to court is impaired when the rules cease to serve [those 
                                                           
344 Id. para. 8.  
345 Id. para. 10.  
346 In the present case, that date was the publication of the album in April 1999. 
347 Călăraşi County Court, judgment of November 24, 2005. 
348 Bucharest Court of Appeal, judgment of February 17, 2006. 
349 Id. 
350 ECtHR, Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 33883/06, April 12, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0412JUD003388306, para. 27. 
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aims]. . . and form a sort of barrier preventing the litigant from having his or 
her case determined on the merits by the competent court.”351  
Applying these rules to the facts of the applicant’s case, the ECtHR 
ruled that the date that should have been taken into account by the domestic 
courts was the date when the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO, 
not the date when that complaint was forwarded by the latter to the police.352 
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that the time it took for 
the RCO to conduct an investigation could not be imputed to the 
applicant.353 Furthermore, the procedural particularities of the Romanian 
system for filing a criminal copyright infringement action did not allow the 
applicant to file his complaint directly with the courts.354 Finally, as it 
concerned the applicant’s joined civil action, the court observed that the 
domestic rules of criminal procedure required a criminal court to settle a 
civil action once it decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings.355 In 
light of the above, the ECtHR concluded:  
[T]he interpretation of the time-limit by the court of last resort, 
followed by the non-examination of the joined civil claim, 
precluded a full examination of the merits of the case and 
impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a 
court for the purpose of the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations.356 
Additionally, two patent disputes examined the right of access to 
courts in situations where the excessive costs of proceedings impede judicial 
review of a case. In X. v. Switzerland,357 the question was whether the denial 
of free legal aid and the obligation to pay a large deposit in order to pursue 
an action for damages in a patent infringement suit prevented the applicant 
from accessing the courts. In the second case, Sté. MATROT v. France,358 
the issue was a civil defendant’s (the company, Sté. MATROT’s) inability 
to appeal on points of law without paying significant damages awarded to 
the claimant by the judgment the defendant intended to appeal.  
In both instances, the applicants’ claims were rejected as manifestly 
ill-founded. In relation to the first case, the Commission reiterated that high 
costs of proceedings may raise an issue under Article 6(1) (fair hearing) of 
                                                           
351 Id. para. 28. 
352 Id. para. 30.  
353 Id. para. 31. 
354 Id. para. 32. 
355 Id. para. 33. 
356 Id. para. 34. 
357 X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]}.  
358 ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98, Dec. 13, 2001, 
CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898 (available only in French). 
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the Convention in certain circumstances.359 The Commission of Human 
Rights, nevertheless, relied on the national court’s finding that the action for 
damages in the applicant’s case was without any prospect of success.360 The 
Commission further considered that the amount of the deposit was not 
disproportionate to the size of the claim.361 With respect to the second case, 
the court similarly found that the requirement to pay damages was 
proportionate in view of the commercial nature of the dispute, the manner 
in which the damages were calculated, and the applicant company’s failure 
to provide any evidence of its financial situation.362 
An interesting case pertaining to the legal costs of proceedings and 
their proper allocation—a separate issue under the right of access to court—
came under the scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court in December 2016. In this 
case, the applicant, Mr. Jensen, had been condemned to pay legal costs of 
an unspecified amount.363 He was convicted in Denmark for violating 
intellectual property rights involving the marketing of substantial quantities 
of counterfeit designer goods such as knives, lamps, and similar products.364 
The judgment, which was read aloud to the applicant, stated that he had to 
pay legal costs, including the lawyers’ fees. The applicant did not appeal that 
judgment. However, in 2010, he was informed that the legal costs he had to 
pay amounted to approximately 77,000 euros—a decision which the 
applicant appealed to the High Court of Denmark.365 He claimed that the 
costs had to be paid entirely or partly by the treasury. His appeal was 
dismissed because it was lodged after the statutorily allotted time limit.366 
According to the high court, the time-limit for an appeal (fourteen days) 
should have been calculated from the moment the applicant was informed 
of the decision that he had to pay legal costs, even if he only later learned 
how much the legal costs amounted to.367 This was because the appeal 
concerned the order to pay the legal costs and not the actual amount of the 
legal fees. 
The applicant appealed to the ECtHR, complaining about the 
system of imposing a duty to pay legal costs in a judgment without specifying 
the amount. The court, however, rejected his claim, holding that there had 
                                                           
359 X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 6958/75 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 10, 1975), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-75046%22]}. 
360 Id. at 158.  
361 Id. 
362 ECtHR, Sté. MATROT v. France (dec.), no. 43798/98, Dec. 13, 2001, 
CE:ECHR:2001:1213DEC004379898, para. 1 (available only in French). 
363 ECtHR, Jensen v. Denmark, no. 8693/11, Dec. 13, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD000869311. 
364 Id. para. 6.  
365 Id. para. 10.  
366 Id. para. 21.  
367 Id. para. 44.  
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been no violation of Article 6(1) (access to court) of the ECHR.368 It 
essentially endorsed the decision of the Danish High Court, observing that 
the appeal did not concern the amount of fees he was ordered to pay but 
solely his duty to pay his legal costs.369 It thus followed that the time limit ran 
from the date of the judgment and not from the date when the applicant 
learned of the exact amount of the fees. 
Despite the applicant’s argument that he could not effectively apprise 
himself of his duty to pay the legal costs because he was not aware that the 
legal costs would be so burdensome, the court observed that he still could 
have argued those costs had to be paid by the treasury even without knowing 
the exact amount owed.370 Since the applicant did not lodge such an appeal 
until the expiration of the time limit for doing so, the Danish High Court’s 
dismissal of his appeal was a foreseeable reaction. The court further 
observed that the applicant also had an opportunity to lodge a complaint 
about the exact amount of legal costs, and the time limit for such a complaint 
would have started to run from the date on which the applicant had been 
informed of that exact amount.371 The applicant had, however, chosen not 
to do so. 
Moving further, Article 6(1) of the ECHR may also be breached 
where the length of domestic proceedings renders the applicant’s right of 
access to courts illusory. The case of Kristiansen v. Norway372 is a good 
illustration. It concerned a refusal by the Norwegian Industrial Property 
Office (NIPO) of a patent application almost eighteen years after the 
application was filed.373 By that time, had a patent been granted in Norway, 
its protection would have expired just two years later since, according to the 
Norwegian Patents Act of 1967, a granted patent could be maintained for 
up to twenty years from the filing date of the patent application.374 
Before the ECtHR, the applicants complained that only when the 
NIPO had given its final decision rejecting their patent application were they 
in a position to institute judicial proceedings to have the matter reviewed by 
the courts.375 This was, however, practically meaningless by that time, given 
the twenty years’ limitation on patent protection under the Patents Act. The 
ECtHR held that this situation had indeed amounted to a violation of Article 
6(1) of the ECHR (access to court).376 In view of the average processing time 
                                                           
368 Id. para. 33.  
369 Id. para. 37. 
370 Id. para. 41. 
371 Id. para. 42. 
372 ECtHR, Kristiansen v. Norway, no. 25498/08, May 2, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808. 
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374 Id. para. 34.  
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of two to three years, the Norwegian Government’s argument that the patent 
authorities could not have evaluated the applicants’ patent application 
earlier failed to convince the court.377  
The ECtHR also noted that, although one of the applicants 
contributed to the length of the proceedings, this was not solely his 
responsibility, and substantial delays were attributable to the NIPO.378 It, 
therefore, followed that, in a situation of administrative delay, the rule 
limiting patent protection to twenty years from the date of filing undermined 
the possibility of establishing patent rights through judicial remedies.379 
Finally, the lack of judicial review of the EPO’s decisions gave rise to a series 
of applications to the ECtHR on the right of access to the courts.380 
Nevertheless, the Convention organs dismissed these cases as inadmissible 
on grounds identical to those advanced in cases involving property claims 
as discussed above—notably, because of “equivalent protection” provided by 
the European Patent Convention.381 The court also emphasized that, by 
deciding to not register patents domestically in a number of European 
countries and choosing to utilize the EPO registration scheme, the 
applicants accepted the limitation on access to courts in the various 
domestic systems.382 
B. Res Judicata 
Another fair trial guarantee—the principle of finality of court 
decisions, or res judicata—was examined at length in two cases against 
Romania which concerned the quashing of a final court judgment in the 
                                                           
377 Id. para. 54.  
378 Id. paras. 54–56. 
379 Id. para. 57. Having reached this conclusion, the court did not find that any separate issue 
arose in relation to the requirement under Article 6(1) of the Convention that national 
proceedings be concluded “within a reasonable time” (on this aspect of the right to a fair trial, 
see infra Section VI.H). 
380 Reber v. Germany, App. No. 27410/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 12, 1996), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%2
2001-2868%22]}; Lenzing AG v. Germany, App. No. 39025/97 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 
9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],% 
22itemid%22:[%22001-4410%22]}; Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabv
iew%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4408%22]}; ECtHR, Rambus Inc. v. 
Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC004038204. 
381 See supra Section II.C. 
382 That limitation, in turn, was considered to be proportionate to the legitimate aim of 
ensuring an effective European system of registration of patents. See, e.g., Lenzing AG v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97, para. 1, (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 9, 1998) 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-4408%22]}. For a critical assessment of a lack of judicial control over the EPO, see 
sources cited supra note 157. 
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applicant companies’ favor following an application for nullity lodged by the 
General Prosecutor of Romania. One of those cases was a dispute over 
exploitation rights for the translation of a novel,383 and another involved the 
right of exclusive use of the applicant company’s trademark.384 In both cases, 
a violation of Article 6(1) (res judicata) and the applicants’ property rights 
(Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) was established because an application for 
nullity lodged by the public prosecutor, who was not a party to the 
proceedings, amounted to an extraordinary remedy contrary to the 
principle of legal certainty.385 
C. Independence and Impartiality 
Several IP cases before the ECtHR questioned a tribunal’s 
independence and impartiality.386 The most indicative is the British-
American Tobacco case,387 in which the applicant company challenged the 
institutional structure of the Netherlands Patent Office, arguing that the 
office failed to provide an independent and impartial tribunal, particularly 
with regard to the manner of appointment of its members. British-American 
Tobacco maintained that the members of the Appeals Division and the 
Examination Division were part of the same administrative body—the Patent 
Office—and were appointed on an interchangeable basis for each individual 
case by the Central Division of the Patent Office.388  
                                                           
383 ECtHR, SC Editura Orizonturi SRL v. Romania, no. 15872/03, May 13, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203 (available only in French). 
384 ECtHR, SC Parmalat Spa v. Romania, no. 37442/03, Feb. 21, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0221JUD003744203 (available only in French). 
385 ECtHR, SC Editura Orizonturi SRL v. Romania, no. 15872/03, May 13, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0513JUD001587203, paras. 61–64 (available only in French); ECtHR, SC 
Parmalat Spa v. Romania, no. 37442/03, Feb. 21, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0221JUD003744203, paras. 25–28 (available only in French). 
386 ECtHR, Dima v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, 
CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (on copyright) (available only in French); Smith Kline 
v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. July 10, 1991), https://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2212633/87%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-73574%
22]} (on patents); ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, 
Nov. 20, 1995, CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992 (on patents, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 387–397); ECtHR, Binder v. Germany (dec.), no. 44455/07, Sept. 20, 
2011, CE:ECHR:2011:0920DEC004445507 (on patents). 
387 ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, Nov. 20, 1995, 
CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992. On this case, see Burkhart Goebel, Trademarks as 
Fundamental Rights—Europe, 99 TRADEMARK REPORTER 931, 937 (2009); Griffiths, supra 
note 332, at 443; Catarina Holtz, Due Process for Industrial Property: European Patenting 
Under Human Rights Control, at 131, 132, 156, 207 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Rättsveternskapliga institutionen). 
388 ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, Nov. 20, 1995, 
CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992, para. 68.  
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The composition of the Appeals Division was entirely left to the 
discretion of the Central Division, without any possibility for third parties to 
object.389 There was no formal guarantee against dismissal or suspension. In 
this respect, the applicant company referred to a case in which a member 
of the Patent Office who refused to carry out an order by his superior was 
dismissed. The British-American Tobacco company submitted, finally, that 
Dutch law did not provide for the possibility to appeal a decision of the 
Appeals Division to a tribunal that satisfied the Convention’s fair trial 
requirements and that the proceedings before the Appeals Divisions were 
not transparent.390 
The case was first examined by the European Commission of 
Human Rights. The Commission held that, although there was no 
manifestation of any personal bias on the part of the members of Appeals 
Division of the Patent Office, its organizational structure failed to 
demonstrate the objective appearance of impartiality.391 Furthermore, it had 
not been shown that the Dutch civil courts had ever considered themselves 
competent to review the decisions of the Appeals Division.392 The 
Commission, therefore, concluded that the applicant company’s case was 
not heard by an independent and impartial tribunal, and it had not been 
established that a remedy before such a tribunal was available to the 
company.393  
The Strasbourg Court, however, disagreed with the Commission’s 
opinion in a judgment of November 1995.394 It noted that, although no 
Dutch civil court had ever held itself competent to review the decisions of 
any Division of the Patent Office regarding patent applications, it could not 
be inferred from this—absent a ruling to the contrary—that the civil-court 
remedy was “ineffective.”395 Accordingly, the applicant company had the 
possibility, under domestic law, to bring the case before civil courts in order 
to establish whether the Appeals Division was a “tribunal” offering 
safeguards required by Article 6(1) of the ECHR (fair hearing). If the civil 
courts found that the Appeals Division failed to meet the ECHR standards, 
they would have had full jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the patent 
application.396 Since the applicant company chose not to avail itself of the 
                                                           
389 Id. paras. 57–58.  
390 Id. para. 81.  
391 B. Co. v. Netherlands, App. No. 19589/92 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 19, 1994), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-45668%22]}, paras. 53–68. 
392 Id. para. 67. 
393 Id. para. 68. 
394 ECtHR, British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, no. 19589/92, Nov. 20, 1995, 
CE:ECHR:1995:1120JUD001958992. 
395 Id. paras. 82–83. 
396 Id. para. 84. 
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judicial remedy, irrespective of its reasons thereof, the Strasbourg Court 
concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR (fair 
hearing).397 
D. Equality of Arms and Adversarial Proceedings 
The Convention institutions considered the right to adversarial 
proceedings and equality of arms only on two occasions, both involving 
Finnish patent proceedings. The first case, decided in 1997, concerned the 
refusal of an applicant company’s patent application before the Finnish 
Board of Patents and Registers on the grounds that the invention lacked the 
requisite inventive character.398 It appeared that the Finnish Board’s organs 
had mentioned in their decisions a document filed by an interested third 
party, which had not been previously communicated to the applicant 
company. On that basis, the applicant company alleged that the principle of 
equality of arms had not been respected.399  
Another case, decided some eighteen years later, pertained to the 
civil proceedings initiated by an applicant who sought compensation for a 
patent license.400 In accordance with the patent law in force at the time of the 
hearing, the Finnish District Court appointed two technical experts to 
provide expertise. The experts’ report was, however, only delivered to the 
parties together with the District Court judgment, thereby excluding the 
possibility of commenting on the report. 
In the Convention organs’ opinion, none of the situations 
amounted to a violation of the principles of equality of arms or adversarial 
proceedings. According to the Strasbourg Court and its former 
Commission, in both instances, the applicants had the opportunity to 
submit their comments in their subsequent appeals to the courts401 or higher 
judicial bodies.402 Accordingly, any alleged procedural error before the 
patent office or the trial court could have been corrected through the later 
judicial proceedings. 
                                                           
397 Id. paras. 86–87. 
398 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on 
H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document
%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}.  
399 Id. para. 64.  
400 ECtHR, Vazvan v. Finland (dec.), no. 61815/13, Nov. 3, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:1103DEC006181513, para. 4. 
401 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94, para. 74 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:  
[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}.  
402 ECtHR, Vazvan v. Finland (dec.), no. 61815/13, Nov. 3, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:1103DEC006181513, para. 32. 
76
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/3
2020] SHAPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 603 
 
 
E. Administration of Evidence 
Several cases on intellectual property implicated the rules on the 
administration of evidence—another procedural guarantee of the right to a 
fair trial.403 From these cases as well as from the court’s general body of case 
law on the questions of evidence, one can infer that, in an overwhelming 
majority of situations, the court abstains from interfering with the way 
domestic courts handle evidence. According to the ECtHR, “[t]he 
admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law 
and, as a rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before 
them.”404 The Strasbourg Court’s task is limited to “ascertain[ing] whether 
the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, 
were fair.”405 The case of Kessler v. Switzerland is a good example.406 
In Kessler, the applicant, who was the president of an animal 
protection association, published two articles in the association’s magazine 
criticizing the practice of fishing with live bait. In the articles, the applicant 
used four drawings taken from the fisheries magazine, Petri Heil, without 
indicating their source and without requesting prior permission for the 
publication of the drawings—an act that subsequently resulted in his 
conviction for copyright infringement.407 
In his application to the ECtHR, the applicant complained, among 
other things, that the domestic courts did not consider some of the evidence 
and arguments advanced by him, including evidence on the applicability of 
quotations and news reporting exceptions to copyright infringement and on 
the general public interest in the contested publication.408 At the outset, the 
court reiterated that the admissibility of evidence was primarily a matter for 
                                                           
403 B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
28112%22]} (on patents) (available only in French); ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), 
no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004, CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (on copyright, 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 406–412) (available only in French); ECtHR, Dima 
v. Romania (dec.), no. 58472/00, May 26, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200 (on 
copyright) (available only in French). 
404 See, among many other authorities, ECtHR, Ramanauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 
74420/01, Feb. 5, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0205JUD007442001, para. 52. 
405 Id.  
406 ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004, 
CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300 (available only in French). 
407 The High Court of the Canton of Thurgau (Tribunal supérieur du canton de Thurgovie) 
ordered the applicant to pay 1,390 euros as compensation for the unauthorized use of 
protected works. See Judgment of 6 July 1999, upheld on appeal by the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court (Tribunal fédéral), judgment of 15 March 2000. 
408 ECtHR, Kessler v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 56933/00, Sept. 14, 2004, 
CE:ECHR:2004:0914DEC005693300, para. 3.b. 
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regulation by national law409 and observed that the judgment in the 
applicant’s case 
was taken following the adversarial proceedings during which the 
applicant was able to challenge the grounds put forward by the 
opposing party and to submit the arguments he considered 
relevant to his case. The courts have assessed the credibility of 
the various items of evidence submitted in the light of the 
circumstances of the case and duly gave reasons for their 
decisions in this connection.410 
In the ECtHR’s opinion, it “[did] not appear that these courts have 
drawn any arbitrary conclusions from the facts submitted to them or have 
exceeded the limits of a reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
applicable to the present case.”411 It thus followed that the applicant’s 
complaint had to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.412 
F. Oral Hearing 
In a number of patent cases, the Strasbourg Court discussed the 
entitlement to an oral hearing as one of the instances of the right to a fair 
trial.413 The absence of an oral hearing in the appellate stage of patent validity 
proceedings was contested in B.A.T. v. Switzerland414 and was found to be 
justified by the highly technical and purely legal nature of the proceedings 
in question.415 The Commission also stressed that the applicant’s claim did 
not concern the absence of an oral hearing throughout the entire 
proceedings but only for one instance, and the fact that the hearing took 
place at the trial court level justified the absence of an oral hearing on 
appeal.416 Similarly, the court found that the possibility of lodging a further 
                                                           
409 Id. 
410 Id. (translation from French by the authors). 
411 Id.  
412 Id.  
413 Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12048/86 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 2, 
1988), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["12048/86"],"itemid":["001-221"]}; B.A.T. v. 
Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4,1996), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-28112%22]} 
(available only in French); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 
23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 2,1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview
%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}. 
414 B.A.T. v. Switzerland, App. No. 26684/95 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Sept. 4, 1996), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-28112%22]} (available only in French). 
415 Id. para. 2. 
416 Id. For further discussion of the entitlement to an oral hearing under Convention case law, 
see EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6: RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
(CIVIL LIMB) paras. 249–56 (2019), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_
Art_6_ENG.pdf. 
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appeal with the court sufficiently remedied the lack of an oral hearing in the 
patent application proceedings before the national patent office.417 
G. Reasoned Judicial Decision 
The right to a fair trial also encompasses the important guarantee 
of a sufficiently reasoned judicial decision. The Strasbourg Court has 
addressed this in the intellectual property context on a number of 
occasions,418 some of which even resulted in a finding of violation of Article 
6(1) of the ECHR (reasoned judicial decision). This was the case, for 
example, in the above-mentioned Dima v. Romania dispute.419 Dima 
concerned, apart from the alleged claim of a violation of the right to 
property discussed in Section II.A.1, the Romanian Supreme Court’s 
failure to address one of the applicant’s grounds for appeal relating to the 
invalidity of an accounting expertise that led to a rejection of his copyright 
claims by the lower courts. In the ECtHR’s opinion, insofar as that 
submission was crucial to the outcome of the proceedings, it required a 
specific and explicit reply, without which there was a violation of Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR (fairness).420 Similarly, the court’s failure to address the 
applicant’s argument relating to her trademark’s priority amounted to a 
violation of the Convention’s right to a fair trial.421 Article 6 of the ECHR, 
while not requiring a detailed answer to every argument, obliged the courts 
deciding on the merits to give a reply to at least those submissions by an 
applicant that were the subject of the argument.422 
                                                           
417 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Finland, App. No. 23749/94 (Eur. Comm’n on 
H.R. Dec. 2, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],
%22itemid%22:[%22001-3374%22]}, paras. 55–56. 
418 Metrat v. France, App. No. 23016/93 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. May 18, 1994), https://hudo
c.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-272
30%22]} (on copyright) (available only in French); ECtHR, Balani v. Spain, no. 18064/91, 
Dec. 9, 1994, CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491 (on trademarks); Denev v. Sweden, 
App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]} (on designs); 
ECtHR, Dima v. Romania, no. 58472/00, Nov. 16, 2006, 
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200 (on copyright) (available only in French). 
419 ECtHR, Dima v. Romania, no. 58472/00, Nov. 16, 2006, 
CE:ECHR:2006:1116JUD005847200. 
420 Id. paras. 39–41. 
421 ECtHR, Balani v. Spain, no. 18064/91, Dec. 9, 1994, 
CE:ECHR:1994:1209JUD001806491. 
422 Id. paras. 27–28. By contrast, a failure of an administrative court to state reasons for 
refusing the applicant’s appeal petition in the design registration proceedings was found 
justified on consideration that, whenever the national law conditioned acceptance of an 
appeal to a decision by the competent court—as was the issue in the applicant’s case—a simple 
refusal or acceptance of the petition by that court was sufficient. Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 
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H. Reasonable Time Guarantee 
A great number of cases on the intersection of intellectual property 
and the right to a fair trial concern the allegedly excessive length of 
proceedings. When addressing this type of disputes, the ECtHR gives 
“regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the 
complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the 
authorities dealing with the case as well as what was at stake for the 
applicant.”423 
In the vast majority of such cases, the approach of the ECtHR is 
largely the same as that applicable to any other type of (non-IP) dispute. A 
few minor particularities exist only in the heightened technical complexity 
of patent litigation and certain copyright and other IP cases, which might 
serve as a justification for the otherwise excessive duration of the 
proceedings. Thus, no violation of Article 6(1) (length) was found in Zhurba 
v. Ukraine.424 In Zhurba, the applicant worked in a company as a senior 
engineer. He claimed compensation for his “innovative proposal”425 that 
consisted of the re-engineering of the heating system in the company, which 
allegedly created significant savings for his employer. The ECtHR held that 
the duration of the proceedings, which lasted four years and five months, 
was not unreasonable mainly due to the “complexity of the controversial 
intellectual property issues at heart of the dispute.”426 Analogously, the 
factual complexity of a copyright infringement dispute over unauthorized 
reproduction of the applicant’s photographs in a travel guide by a Georgian 
                                                           
25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Apr. 9, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22
tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]}.  
423 See, among many other authorities, ECtHR, Nemec v. Slovakia, no. 48672/99, Nov. 15, 
2001, CE:ECHR:2001:1115JUD004867299, para. 34. 
424 ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503. 
425 The Civil Code of Ukraine recognizes an “innovative proposal” (раціоналізаторська 
пропозиція), alongside literary works, computer programs, trademarks, etc., among the 
subject matters of intellectual property rights. See Civil Code of Ukraine, No. 435-IV, of 16 
January 2003, art. 420 (as amended up to 2 November 2016) (UA127) (available in 
Ukrainian), https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/181865 [https://perma.cc/CFZ3-ZRFU]. 
According to Article 481(1) of the Code, “An innovative proposal is a proposal which is 
recognised by a legal entity and which contains a technological (technical) or organizational 
solution in any field of activity.” “The rights in innovative proposal vest in its author and the 
legal entity to which such a proposal is submitted.” Id. art. 483(1). “The author of an 
innovative proposal shall have the right to fair remuneration by the legal entity to which this 
proposal is submitted,” whereas “[the] legal entity that has recognized an innovative proposal 
has the right to use this proposal to any extent.” Id. art. 484 (translation from Ukrainian by 
the authors). 
426 ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503, para. 1. 
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company contributed, together with several other factors, to the finding that 
the overall length of the less-than-four-year proceedings was not excessive.427  
By contrast, a violation of the reasonable-time guarantee was 
established in Jamriška v. Slovakia,428 where the applicant sought 
acknowledgement of patent rights and compensation for two technological 
improvements proposed by him to his employer. According to the court, 
the proceedings in that case—which lasted, in relevant part, for five years and 
ten months—although complex, were delayed mainly due to the failure of 
the trial court to proceed with the case in an effective manner.429 
Accordingly, the technical complexity of the dispute was not enough to 
justify its protracted duration. 
It is worth mentioning that, in a number of intellectual property 
cases where the applicants complained about excessive length of domestic 
proceedings, the court’s analysis was not only from the perspective of Article 
6(1) (fair hearing) but also from the standpoint of Article 13, which 
guarantees the right to an effective national remedy.430 
                                                           
427 ECtHR, Schrade v. Georgia (dec.), no. 9289/08, Feb. 2, 2016, 
CE:ECHR:2016:0202DEC000928908, para. 29. The other factors taken into consideration 
in this regard were: (1) the fact that the proceedings “were spanned over three levels of 
jurisdiction, some of which were called to examine the case twice;” (2) the fact that the 
applicant had contributed, by his own conduct, to certain delays in the proceedings, which 
“were then validly stayed pending the outcome of the associated criminal proceedings;” and 
(3) “the overall conduct of the authorities which [could not] be blamed for lack of due 
diligence.” Id. 
428 ECtHR, Jamriška v. Slovakia, no. 51559/99, Oct. 14, 2003, 
CE:ECHR:2003:1014JUD005155999. 
429 Id. paras. 29–31. 
430 See, establishing a violation of both provisions, ECtHR, Kuzin v. Russia, no. 22118/02, 
June 9, 2005, CE:ECHR:2005:0609JUD002211802 (civil proceedings concerning the 
recognition of the applicant’s copyright and an award of damages that lasted more than five 
and a half years in one court); ECtHR, Abramiuc v. Romania, no. 37411/02, Feb. 24, 2009, 
CE:ECHR:2009:0224JUD003741102 (available only in French) (alleging lack of an effective 
remedy whereby the applicant could have raised a complaint based on the excessive length 
of the two sets of proceedings in a patent infringement dispute); ECtHR, Mol v. Netherlands 
(dec.), no. 10470/07, June 16, 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0616DEC001047007 (proceedings in 
a civil dispute concerning alleged infringement of intellectual property rights to a computer 
program that lasted for more than fifteen years); ECtHR, Mirković v. Serbia (dec.), no. 
40053/06, Mar. 23, 2010, CE:ECHR:2010:0323DEC004005306 (proceedings in a 
copyright-related civil suit that lasted for more than six years); ECtHR, Zarubica v. Serbia 
(dec.), no. 47250/07, May 11, 2010, CE:ECHR:2010:0511DEC004725007 (proceedings in 
a copyright-related civil suit that lasted for more than six years).  
For examples of cases where these two provisions were considered separately, see 
ECtHR, Zhurba v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11215/03, June 19, 2007, 
CE:ECHR:2007:0619DEC001121503 (civil proceedings seeking to have the applicant’s 
works declared “an innovative proposal” and to obtain remuneration that lasted four years 
and five months before three levels of jurisdiction); ECtHR, Rapos v. Slovakia, no. 25763/02, 
May 20, 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:0520JUD002576302 (civil proceedings in a design dispute 
that lasted more than twelve years before two levels of jurisdiction).  
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As already discussed, the ECtHR’s approach to the resolution of the 
length-of-proceedings disputes in the IP context does not differ substantially 
from that in non-IP cases.431 The case of Denev v. Sweden432 stands out in 
this general pattern. There, a finding of violation of Article 6(1) (length) 
arose, mainly, not out of an assessment of the common criteria laid down 
in the court’s case law but from the particular subject matter of the action. 
The case concerned the proceedings before administrative courts, which 
were decisive for the registration of the applicant’s design and normally took 
one month at each level. In the applicant’s case, however, the administrative 
court proceedings lasted for almost four years.433 Complaining about the 
excessive length of proceedings in his case, the applicant maintained that, 
had his design eventually been registered, the protection afforded would 
have been practically useless because it would have almost expired given the 
five-year period of protection, calculated from the date of the filing of the 
design application.434 The Human Rights Commission agreed, holding that 
there had been a violation of Article 6(1) (reasonable time).435 It noted: 
[S]pecial regard should be had to the fact that the registration of 
a design—should it be granted—is valid for only five years from the 
date of the filing of the application. In the light of the criteria 
established by the case-law and having regard to the 
circumstances of the present case, the Commission therefore 
considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and 
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.436 
I. Further Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings 
While the above-discussed fair trial guarantees apply to both civil 
and criminal proceedings, the ECHR provides some additional safeguards 
to parties in criminal cases. These safeguards are also featured in a number 
                                                           
On the relationship between Article 6(1) (reasonable time) and Article 13 (effective 
remedy) of the ECHR, see DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, ED BATES & CARLA 
BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 570–72 (2d ed. 
2009). 
431 See Griffiths, supra note 332, at 443 (“There seems little obvious reason why the right to 
a timely trial should be more likely to be breached in intellectual property proceedings than 
in any other form of trial.”). 
432 Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22
001-46116%22]}. On this case, see Holtz, supra note 387, at 76, 172, 203, 393–94, 485. 
433 Denev v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94, para. 2 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998).  
434 Id. 
435 Id. para. 38. 
436 Id. para. 37; cf. ECtHR, Kristiansen v. Norway, no. 25498/08, May 2, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0502JUD002549808 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 372–379). 
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of intellectual property decisions.437 The most interesting example is likely 
the guarantee of legality, which was at stake in Donald v. France discussed 
above.438 There, the applicants complained about—in addition to a violation 
of their freedom to impart information—national courts’ restrictive 
interpretation of the internal copyright exception allowing the reproduction 
of artistic works for news reporting439.  
As already mentioned, the French courts ruled that the exception 
in question (on which the applicants built their defense) was “inapplicable 
to the creations of the seasonal fashion industries and articles of fashion”440 
depicted on the applicants’ photographs. According to the applicants, such 
an interpretation “enlarged the scope of application of the offense of 
counterfeiting,”441 thereby running afoul of the principle enshrined in Article 
7 of the ECHR that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to 
an accused’s detriment. The ECtHR, however, refrained from intervening 
with the interpretation of French law adopted by the national courts—
notably, the French Supreme Court—and reiterated that the Strasbourg 
Court’s role was limited to verifying the compatibility of the effects of such 
an interpretation with the Convention. The ECtHR observed:  
[T]he Supreme Court decided on the scope of application of an 
exception to the rule protecting the legitimate rights of authors. 
The Court does not consider that there is any element in its 
interpretation capable of constituting an infringement of the 
principles laid down by Article 7 of the Convention.442 
                                                           
437 On the rights of defense, see EVORA B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 32601/96 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R. Dec. 3, 1997), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22
:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-4046%22]} (on trademarks); ECtHR, 
Eskelinen v. Finland, no. 43803/98, Aug. 8, 2006, CE:ECHR:2006:0808JUD004380398 (on 
trade secrets); ECtHR, Hanževački v. Croatia, no. 17182/07, Apr. 16, 2009, 
CE:ECHR:2009:0416JUD001718207 (on software copyright). On the entrapment defense, 
see ECtHR, Volkov v. Russia, nos. 7614/09, 30863/10, Mar. 26, 2015, 
CE:ECHR:2015:0326JUD000761409 (on software copyright). 
438 ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908 (available only in French); see also discussion supra 
Section III.A.2. 
439 Article L. 122-5 9° of the French Intellectual Property Code of 1 July 1992, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=322949 [https://perma.cc/4JDS-R3V2] 
(available in French). 
440 ECtHR, Donald v. France, no. 36769/08, Jan. 10, 2013, 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, para. 20 (available only in French, translation in 45 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 354 (2014)). 
441 Id.  
442 Id. para. 23. 
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J. Enforcement of a Final Judicial Decision 
The last procedural guarantee that gave rise to a number of cases 
involving intellectual property proceedings is the right to timely enforcement 
of final court decisions. Thus, an eleven-year delay in enforcing a final 
judgment that ordered a State-owned company to compensate the applicant 
for an unauthorized use of his invention was found contrary to both Article 
6(1) (enforcement of a final court decision) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
(protection of property) of the ECHR.443  
On another occasion, a failure to enforce a final court judgment—
awarding the applicant royalties for the use of a patent—because of several 
procedural errors committed by domestic courts had likewise resulted in a 
finding of a violation of the Convention.444 On the other hand, a delay of 
almost five years in complying with a court judgment that required a private 
debtor to pay the applicant damages for copyright infringement was not 
deemed inappropriate under Article 6(1) of the ECHR because of the 
private nature of the dispute and the applicant’s own failure to display the 
necessary diligence in enforcing the judgment.445 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has reviewed the ECtHR’s approach to intellectual 
property from the perspective of different human rights guaranteed in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which the ECtHR considers in IP 
cases. So far, the central focus of the ECtHR in such cases has been on the 
Convention’s property and freedom of expression clauses. With regard to 
the former, the ECtHR made it clear that Article 1 of the First Protocol to 
the ECHR applies to intellectual property, and its scope of influence is not 
limited to disputes originating in a direct state action. According to the 
ECtHR, the Convention is also applicable, in certain circumstances, to 
private-party litigation. This is possible because of the horizontal effect of 
the Convention that imposes on State Parties to the Convention the positive 
obligation to ensure—primarily through their respective judicial systems—
that the individual rights protected by the Convention are not unduly 
restrained.  
However, as the right to property is among the rights to which the 
margin of appreciation accorded to domestic authorities “usually deploys its 
full effect,”446 the national determinations on applicants’ IP rights are 
                                                           
443 ECtHR, Abramiuc v. Romania, no. 37411/02, Feb. 24, 2009, 
CE:ECHR:2009:0224JUD003741102 (available only in French). 
444 ECtHR, I.D. v. Romania, no. 3271/04, Mar. 23, 2010, 
CE:ECHR:2010:0323JUD000327104 (available only in French). 
445 ECtHR, Cerăceanu v. Romania (no. 1), no. 31250/02, Mar. 4, 2008, 
CE:ECHR:2008:0304JUD003125002 (available only in French). 
446 Ducoulombier, supra note 159, at 46. 
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unlikely to be overturned by the ECtHR, except in the case of a flagrant 
violation. Since the scope of property protection is largely left to the 
discretion of national legislatures, limitations in the public interest are likely 
to be permissible in accordance with the concept of the social function of 
property. The danger of excessive protection of IP rights by the Convention, 
as is sometimes emphasized by some scholars,447 should certainly not be 
overlooked.448 
Similarly, regarding the right to freedom of expression and 
information, the court has developed an extensive body of case law in the 
area of intellectual property protection. In particular, it has allowed an 
external freedom of expression defense outside the traditional internal 
balancing mechanisms of copyright and trademark laws. At the same time, 
the Convention system did not clearly exclude the possibility of bringing 
forward an Article 10 argument in order to support an IP claim. 
The Convention’s property and free expression provisions were, 
however, not the only ones the ECtHR used to interpret the scope of IP 
protection in Europe. Notably, the particular manner in which the remedies 
for infringement could be exercised actuated the guarantees of the 
Convention’s right to privacy. This became very clear on application of the 
search orders based on a suspicion of IP infringement. Besides these rather 
specific cases, it has also been demonstrated that the right to privacy has 
broader—though still largely theoretical—implications for the area of moral 
rights. Some case law has further emerged in relation to the right to be free 
from discrimination. 
In addition to material rights, the procedural guarantees of Article 
6 of the Convention (fair trial) also apply to intellectual property disputes. 
In many instances, consideration of the intellectual property claims brought 
under this Convention provision does not differ substantially from any other 
type of non-IP dispute. In certain situations, however, the particular nature 
of IP rights and litigation is decisive for the final resolution of the case by 
the ECtHR.449 
IP lawyers and judges must rethink and study more carefully the 
role of the ECtHR’s judicial practice vis-à-vis the IP framework. This is clear 
because of the already existing IP case law of the ECtHR that was the focus 
of this article, the Court’s increased interest in approaching this type of 
(essentially private law) dispute from the external human rights perspective, 
                                                           
447 See Robert Burrell & Dev Gangjee, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression—A Call for 
Caution, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 544 (2010). 
448 See Geiger, supra note 23, at 661. 
449 For the most remarkable example in the context of a reasonable time guarantee, see Denev 
v. Sweden, App. No. 25419/94 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R. Jan. 14, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-3557%22]} 
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 432–436).  
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and the recent developments in the European legal arena, including an 
obligation of the E.U. to accede to the ECHR in the future.450 Indeed, a 
deeper understanding of the precise ways in which IP and human rights 
interoperate can help to create a more balanced and nuanced system of IP 
protection not only in Europe but also in other regions and countries 
(including the United States) where human rights and constitutional rights 
are recognized as fundamental values meriting the highest level of 
protection. 
                                                           
450 See Article 6(2) TEU, as amended by Article 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon, and Article 
59(2) of the ECHR, as amended by Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. Although 
the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of E.U. accession to the ECHR (Opinion 2/13 
of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the accession, which remains 
binding on the E.U. 
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